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ABSTRACT PAGE

Significant links exist between cryptography and computational learning theory. Cryptographic
functions are the usual method of demonstrating significant intractability results in
computational learning theory as they can demonstrate that certain problems are hard in a
representation independent sense. On the other hand, hard learning problems have been used
to create efficient cryptographic protocols such as authentication schemes, pseudo-random
permutations and functions, and even public key encryption schemes.
Learning theory I coding theory also impacts cryptography in that it enables cryptographic
primitives to deal with the issues of noise or bias in their inputs. Several different constructions
of "fuzzy" primitives exist, a fuzzy primitive being a primitive which functions correctly even in
the presence of "noisy", or non-uniform inputs. Some examples of these primitives include
error-correcting blockciphers, fuzzy identity based cryptosystems, fuzzy extractors and fuzzy
sketches. Error correcting blockciphers combine both encryption and error correction in a
single function which results in increased efficiency. Fuzzy identity based encryption allows the
decryption of any ciphertext that was encrypted under a "close enough" identity. Fuzzy
extractors and sketches are methods of reliably (re)-producing a uniformly random secret key
given an imperfectly reproducible string from a biased source, through a public string that is
called the "sketch".
While hard learning problems have many qualities which make them useful in constructing
cryptographic protocols, such as their inherent error tolerance and simple algebraic structure, it
is often difficult to utilize them to construct very secure protocols due to assumptions they
make on the learning algorithm. Due to these assumptions, the resulting protocols often do not
have security against various types of "adaptive" adversaries. To help deal with this issue, we
further examine the inter-relationships between cryptography and learning theory by
introducing the concept of "adaptive learning". Adaptive learning is a rather weak form of
learning in which the learner is not expected to closely approximate the concept function in its
entirety, rather it is only expected to answer a query of the learner's choice about the target.
Adaptive learning allows for a much weaker learner than in the standard model, while
maintaining the the positive properties of many learning problems in the standard model, a fact
which we feel makes problems that are hard to adaptively learn more useful than standard
model learning problems in the design of cryptographic protocols. We argue that learning
parity with noise is hard to do adaptively and use that assumption to construct a related key
secure, efficient MAC as well as an efficient authentication scheme. In addition we examine
the security properties of fuzzy sketches and extractors and demonstrate how these properties
can be combined by using our related key secure MAC. We go on to demonstrate that our
extractor can allow a form of related-key "hardening" for protocols in that, by affecting how the
key for a primitive is stored it renders that protocol immune to related key attacks.

Dedicated to my family, my friends, and all those who helped me survive and thrive in
these past 5 years.
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ADAPTIVE LEARNING AND CRYPTOGRAPHY

Chapter 1

Introduction
1.1

Introduction

Cryptography and computational learning theory may seem to be opposite disciplines, but
many linkages exist between them. Two of these links are the existence/ utility of hard
problems, and the use of learning theoretic ideas to help cryptographic protocols tolerate
noisy, biased data.

Hard Cryptographic Problems

The standard method of showing that a cryptographic

protocol is secure in a computational sense is building a reduction between a poly-time machine that breaks the security properties of the protocol, to one that solves some mathematical problem. As long as the problem is thought to be hard (require exponential computation)
to solve, the cryptographic protocol is then considered to be secure. Many mathematical
problems such as DDH, CDH, factoring, discrete logs and others have had their hardness
extensively analyzed and have also found large use in cryptographic protocols.
Problems that have found use in cryptography have several properties in common. First,
cryptographic problems are not known to be NP-Complete or even NP-Hard. The hardness
of a given cryptographic problem is assumed due to various arguments, or simply because a
polynomial time algorithm solving the problem has yet to be discovered after years of effort.
As such, it is important to find multiple different hard problems for use in cryptography
2

3
as it may be the case that a problem that is thought to be hard now, will be shown
to be solvable later on. As a practical example of this consider earlier constructions of
cryptographic protocols based off of the hardness of various knapsack problems. In addition,
most commonly used "cryptographic" problems such as discrete log, factoring and others
will be rendered insecure given the existence of quantum computing.
Second, cryptographic problems are assumed hard under average case assumptions, as
opposed to being hard only in the worst case, and these problems are thought to be hard
under strong adaptive adversaries as well. A hard problem that is useful in cryptographic
protocols must be thought to be hard on average, otherwise protocols based off of the
problem may be insecure most of the time even while being "secure" for special cases. With
regards to the adaptivity of the algorithm solving the problem, the abilities of the adversary
which attempts to solve these hard problems reflects the strength of a real life adversary
which tries to break the resulting protocol. As cryptographic protocols attempt to be secure
for all imaginable attacks, this usually requires that the underlying cryptographic problem
be secure against the strongest possible adversaries.

Hard Problems in Computational Learning Theory

Now compare a hard "cryp-

tographic" problem to a hard problem in computational learning theory. A "standard"
construction of a learning problem is as follows: Begin with a class of concept functions C
and a set of hypothesis functions 7t where all functions in each class are polynomial time.
Let an algorithm receive "samples" of a concept function x, c(x) +e where xis sampled from
some input distribution on the domain of c and e is sampled from some noise distribution.
Can the algorithm output a function h

<---

7t that is a "close enough" approximation to c?

A learning problem is considered hard if no algorithm is likely to produce an approximation in 7t for a selected function in C. A hardness result is representation independent,
or a concept class C is hard to learn in a representation independent sense if there is no
algorithm which can output a hypothesis function h of a selected function c for any class
of functions H.

4

Hard learning theory problems have found use in cryptographic protocols. A learning
problem that is hard to solve, even in a representation independent sense is a problem that
is hard for any polynomial time algorithm to solve. As such, if a reduction exists between an
adversary breaking the security of a protocol and an algorithm solving the learning problem,
this functions as a proof of the security of the protocol. Moreover, learning problems often
involve sets of functions C that are computationally simple to sample from

I

store and are

algebraically simple to evaluate. As we show in our thesis, these properties of a learning
problem have resulted in very efficient protocols which have error correcting as well as
related key security properties. In addition, representation independent learning

I

coding

theory problems are often known to be NP-Hard or NP-Complete in the worst case, and
possess strong evidence of being hard even given the existence of quantum computation.
Also while significant strides have been made in solving many "traditional" cryptographic
problems such as factoring or DDH, research has been less successful in improving our
ability to solve most hard learning problems.
Though learning theoretic problems often have many qualities which make them attractive in protocol design, the learning theory

I

coding theory model makes several assump-

tions about the nature of the learning algorithm which renders a hard learning problem
difficult to use in the design of very secure cryptographic protocols. One such assumption
is that, due to the fact that learning problems are often known to be NP-Hard or even
NP-Complete they are not necessarily hard on average. A class of functions C is considered
hard to learn even if the learning algorithm can closely approximate most of the functions
in C as long as one function is hard to approximate. This differs from commonly used cryptographic problems, as those problems are thought to be hard on average, not just hard
in the worst case. A much greater issue is that a hard learning problem usually tasks a
"weak" adversary to perform a "large" task especially when compared to a cryptographic
problem. Consider the difference between a hard learning problem, and a standard type
of hard "cryptographic" problem, namely that of distinguishing a certain distribution from
random. The learning problem is hard if an algorithm cannot closely approximate the dis-
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tribution given only random samples from that distribution, while the adversary tasked to
solve the cryptographic problem is asked only to distinguish a distribution from random.
It is not necessarily the case that an algorithm which distinguishes a distribution from ran-

dom, can closely approximate that distribution.

1

Moreover, algorithms tasked to solve

hard cryptographic problems are often given large amounts of adaptivity when compare to
hard learning problems. Consider the difference between a hard learning problem that gives
the algorithm samples c(x) + e where x is randomly selected, and an algorithm tasked to
break the security of a MAC, which is given the ability to adaptively requests MAC's of
selected messages m.
As a practical example of all these issues, consider the problem of learning parity functions under noise. This is a hard learning problem that has had some success being utilized
in cryptographic protocols. The problem is computationally easy to compute, instances of
the problem are easy to sample, and it is algebraically simple (the whole problem involves
nothing but linear functions). In order to do utilize the learning parity with noise problem in building cryptographic protocols however, the problem is argued to be hard under
average case assumptions (uniform selection of the parity function, inputs and correctly
weighted error vector) as well as being hard even in a representation independent sense,
that is it is hard to come up with any algorithm that can closely approximate the parity
function. Another learning problem that has been used to develop cryptographic protocols,
the polynomial reconstruction problem has been treated in a similar way. While these problems have been used in cryptographic protocols such as McEliece, HB#, HB++ and others,
those protocols are not secure against most types of "adaptive" adversarial attack.

Biased, Noisy Data and Cryptography

Most cryptographic protocols assume the

existence of uniform, perfectly reproducible randomness. Practically though uniform randomness is often hard to produce and can be especially hard to reproduce accurately. Due
to this issue a great deal of research has been done in allowing cryptographic protocols
1
Consider the insecure pseudorandom permutation EK(m) = liiE'r<(m) where E'r< is a secure blockcipher.
EK(m) is not pseudorandom, but because E'r< is secure, EK will be hard to predict.

6
to function correctly in the presence of quasi-random and/or noisy data. Many different
cryptographic protocols exist which allow for error tolerance in the various inputs / outputs. Error Correcting Blockciphers combine decryption and error correction into a single
function, rather than requiring two separate functions to fulfill these needs. Identity Based
Cryptosystems are cryptosystems in which any string can be considered a valid public key
thus allowing everyone's "identity" (where this identity can be considered some piece of
publicly known information) to serve as a public key. A Fuzzy Identity Based Cryptosystem

•

is a cryptosystem where a message encrypted using public key w can be decrypted using
the private key associated with w' as long as w and w' are "close enough" identities.
While a fuzzy IBE scheme deals with errors in a public key, a fuzzy sketch / extractor
deals with errors in the private key. A fuzzy sketch is a method of storing and reliably
reproducing a sample from a noisy, imperfectly random distribution by publishing a public
string known as a sketch. This sketch can be said to store the value by functioning as a way
of correcting errors in future inputs. The stored value can be recovered given the sketch and
any value considered "close" to the original. A fuzzy extractor is a similar protocol that
produces a random string based off of a imperfectly random sample, and can reconstruct
this string based off of a published sketch and any sample that is close to the original. After
the original work of [13], additional security properties of fuzzy extractors and sketches have
been proposed:
Reusability:

A sketch is considered reusable if seeing multiple different sketches of

the same value reveals little additional information about that value.
Robustness:

A sketch is considered robust if an adversary cannot produce a differ-

ent valid sketch of a secret w after seeing one sketch of w.
Insider Secure: A fuzzy extractor is considered insider secure if an adversary capable

of viewing multiple sketches of an adaptively perturbed secret, manipulating sketches
the challenger receives while observing the resulting extracted key, cannot learn any
information about the key extracted from an unmodified sketch unknown sketch.

7

Our Work We propose the idea of adaptive learning and examine its impact on cryptography. Adaptive learning is a weaker form of learning than the standard learning model
in that it imposes a much smaller requirement on the adversary. The adversary which attempts to solve an adaptive learning problem need not be able to closely approximate the
target function, it need only answer an adaptively chosen query about the target function.
Problems which are hard to adaptively learn are closer to the traditional idea of a hard
cryptographic problem due to this increased adaptivity and weaker information requirement. We feel this makes hard adaptive learning problems well suited for use in the design
of cryptographic protocols. Problems which are hard to learn adaptively give us all the
efficiency and simple structure of a normal learning problem, yet eliminate many of the
difficulties inherent in turning a traditional learning problem into a cryptographic protocol
secure against adaptive adversaries.
We examine the learning parity with noise problem (LPN) and from it develop the
strong bit finding (SBF) and strong hidden codeword finding (SHCF) problems as the
adaptive versions of LPN. The strong bit finding problem tasks an adversary to find (c, x)
for an adaptively chosen vector c and a randomly selected vector x while the strong hidden
codeword finding problem, the pseudo-repetition of SBF, tasks an adversary to find a vector
that is "close" to Cb* for an adaptively chosen vector b* and a random matrix C. From
these problems we construct a highly efficient fully secure authentication protocol as well
as an efficient, error correcting related key secure MAC. Going on, we examine the security
properties of fuzzy sketches and extractors and utilize our related key secure MAC to
construct a strongly robust fuzzy extractor, a fuzzy extractor which is both reusable, and
(computationally) robust given multiple queries. We also show that this strongly robust
fuzzy extractor implies a related key secure MAC, as well as many other primitives through a
phenomenon that we call "related-key hardening", a technique for creating protocols which
are related key secure out of a great many protocols which are not originally related key
secure by changing how the keys for the protocols are stored.

8

1.2

Prior Work

Learning Theory and Cryptography

Cryptography and computational learning the-

ory are two separate areas of computer science which have had significant interactions
in the past. Various intractability results in computational learning theory utilize cryptographic constructions in their proofs [47, 37, 3].

In addition, several learning prob-

lems which are thought to be hard have been used to create cryptographic constructions [1, 37, 39, 30, 31, 33]. The two most prominent learning problems used to create
cryptographic protocols are the "learning parity with noise" problem and the "polynomial
reconstruction problem". These problems are quite similar in nature. Both concern themselves with learning some target function

J, given many samples of the form f(xi), where

each sample is perturbed with some probability. For the LPN problem, the target function
is linear, while in the polynomial reconstruction problem the target function is a polynomial
of fixed degree. The learning parity with noise problem has been the basis of several authentication protocols, [31, 33, 30] as well as a public key cryptosystem [45]. Similarly, the polynomial reconstruction problem (PR) has been the basis of a public key encryption scheme as
well as a commitment scheme and a blockcipher [39, 4]. Attacks on the various constructions
and the underlying learning problems have been proposed. [40, 25, 16, 28, 12, 42].
The HB family of protocols, HB, HB+, and HB#, all based off of the LPN problem,
do not require the use of cryptographic primitives and as such are very efficient, however
they have not been shown to be secure against the same class of adversaries (namely, fully
adaptive man in the middle adversaries). The original protocol, HB [31], is easily seen to
be insecure against an adversary who can act as a reader as well as passively observing
instances of the authentication protocol. HB+ [33] deals with this difficulty, however HB+
has been shown to be insecure against an adversary who can modify messages sent by a
valid reader during an instance of the protocol, and who can see if that instance is accepted
by the reader. HB# is secure in that model however it has recently been shown insecure
against a fully adaptive man in the middle adversary [30, 10].

9

Fuzzy Sketches

Many methods to deal with error tolerance in cryptography have been

proposed. The most predominant amongst these are methods dealing with biased or noisy
keys whether public [50, 5, 24, 23] or private [8, 7, 32, 26, 48, 21].
Predominantly, work in tolerating errors in public keys has concerned itself with fuzzy
identity based encryption schemes. Identity based encryption is an asymmetric encryption
scheme where the public key is allowed to be any arbitrary string and as such each individual
using such a scheme can have his email address, phone number, license plate number of some
other piece of personal public information represent his public key. Fuzzy Identity Based
Encryption allows a person with identity w and corresponding private key K to decrypt
a message encrypted under identity w' as long as w and w' are close enough. Various
constructions of Fuzzy IBE schemes have been created.
Work in tolerating errors in private keys has predominantly concerned itself with the
construction of secure sketches and fuzzy extractors. These protocols were first proposed
in 2004 [22] by Dodis, Reyzin and Smith as a methodology for allowing a secret key to be
derived and transmitted over an insecure channel, given only imperfectly reconstructible,
biased data. The secure sketch is used as a method for storing a biased value in such
a way that it can be recovered by any value close to the original. A fuzzy extractor is
built from a secure sketch and an extractor, by using the extractor on the stored value
to produce a random, consistent key. Several different constructions of secure sketches
and extractors have been given [22, 18, 17], for varying choices of the underlying distance
metric. Boyen shows that prior definitions are not adequate to cases in which the fuzzy
secret is used multiple times, and defines the notion of a reusable sketch which addresses
this problem [13].
When a fuzzy extractor is used for the purposes of authentication, there remains the
possibility of an adversary modifying the sketch as it is sent across the communications
channel, which could lead to a form of man-in-the-middle attack. To avoid this, Boyen et
al. defined the notion of a robust sketch: a sketch for which no adversary can produce a valid
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sketch after seeing one single valid sketch [14]. Boyen et al. made a keyless 2 , statistically
robust sketch in the random oracle model. Several subsequent improvements have been
described in the literature using the same basic "one-time robustness" definition. Dodis
et al. constructed a keyless, statistically robust sketch in the plain model [20]. Cramer et
al. [19] and Kanukruthi and Reyzin [35] give robust sketches that lead to fuzzy extractors
that produce relatively longer outputs for similar parameters; the former in the common
random string model, the latter in the plain model.
In addition to tolerating errors in keys, public and private, work has been done on
the construction of error correcting blockciphers. Normal blockciphers are very sensitive
to errors during decryption. If a single bit is flipped this can often result in a complete
decryption failure. Thus it is often necessary to encode encrypted data through some error
correcting code before tranmission. While these two steps can be handled independently
several constructions of primitives have been given that combine these two properties into
one function [44, 43].

Related Key Security

Related-key attacks are attacks against constructions using a

secret key (such as a blockcipher) in which an attacker attempts to exploit known or chosen
relationships among keys to circumvent security properties. Several related-key attacks on
primitives have been developed [38, 49, 46], including attacks on AES [29, 9, 52, 10]. While
the realism of an adversary's ability to directly influence a secret key is questionable, the
issue of related-key security has implications beyond such a setting. For instance, weakness in a blockcipher's key scheduling algorithm may result in known likely relationships
amongst round keys, which could lead to an attack against the cipher [6]. As another example, blockcipher based hash functions are only proven secure in the ideal cipher model [11];
in this strong model, related-key security is implied [6]. Thus, the use of a real blockcipher
for hashing that is not related-key secure is theoretically questionable: in many such constructions, the adversary's ability to choose the message to be hashed implies an ability to
2
Note that if the sender and recipient of a secure sketch share a key, this would imply an authenticated
channel. So, only keyless constructions, or constructions with very short keys, are of any interest.
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launch related-key attacks on the underlying cipher. Indeed, a recent paper by Biryukov et
al has made substantial progress on attacking AES-256 in Davies-Meyer mode via a strong
related-key attack on AES [10]. Finally, there are settings in which related-key security
has been put to good use: several papers make use of schemes with one-time related-key
security properties in order to make fuzzy extractors robust against adversarial modification [20, 19, 35].
Positive results concerning related-key security are few. Bellare and Kohno [6] develop
a theoretical framework for defining related-key security, show that some notions of relatedkey security are inherently impossible, and prove that an ideal cipher is related-key secure
for a general class of relations. Lucks [41] shows how to achieve "partial" related-key security (meaning, that only part of the key can be varied), and also gave two proposed
constructions of related-key secure pseudorandomness from novel, very strong number theoretic assumptions.

Chapter 2

Preliminaries
2.1

Notation

In this section, we list some general notations/definitions that will be used throughout the
rest of the thesis.

Matrices And Vectors

In general, we will denote a vector in boldface, (i.e. x), and we

will denote then i'th element of the vector x as Xi· We denote the set of all binary k-column
by n-row matrices as M~. We denote individual matrices using bold capital letters. For a
matrix X, we denote the i'th row of X as [x]i, the j'th colum of X as [x]J, and the (i,j)'th
entry of X as [x]i. We denote the all O's and all 1's vectors as 0 and 1 respectively. The
inner product of x and y is denoted as (x, y). We denote the set of all binary vectors of
length n and Hamming weight t as

Sets and Random Variables

Hf.

We denote the power set of a set X as P(X). If an element

xis uniformly selected from a set X we denote this as x

<--

X. We use a similar notation if

x is sampled from a random variable X. If a family of random variables X is parameterized
by parameters x 1, x2, X3 we denote the family of variables as Xx 1 ,x 2 ,x 3 and a member of that
family as

Xx 1 ,x 2 ,x3·

12
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Metric Space

A metric space M is a set along with a distance function

llx- Yll

which

has the following properties:

llx- Yll = IIY- xll·
Non-Negative: llx - Yll ~ 0 with equality iff x

1. Symmetric:

2.

3. Triangle Inequality: 1::/z,
Codes

= y.

llx- Yll :": : llx- zll +liz- Yll

A code Cis a subset of metric space M along with a tuple of algorithms (C, c- 1 , D).

The minimum distance of a code Cis d = minvx,yEcl!x- Yll· For an efficient (n, k, t) code,
C is the encoding function which takes elements of a domain of size 2k to C,

c- 1 is

the

decoding function which reverses this process, and D has the property that for all m E C,

m' EM,

if

lim- m'll :": : t then D(m') = m.

A [n, k, t]linear code is a code where C is a k dimensional linear subspace of M. As
such, C(x) = Cx where Cis ann by k matrix, and xis a k-bit vector. In addition to C, c- 1
and D a linear code C has a parity check matrix H of rank n- k, where 1::/c E C, He= 0.
For a vector mE M we refer to Hm as the syndrome of m, or syn(m).

Algorithms, Adversaries and Oracles

When referring to an algorithm Alg run on

input x, we denote this as Alg(x). We denote F(w; r) as the algorithm F running on wand
utilizing randomness r. When the randomness is not important or clear from context we
simply write F(w). We will denote adversaries by A, and the family of adversaries that use
q queries and t time as Aq,t· If an adversary A uses an oracle 0 which takes input x, we

denote this as A 0 (x). We denote AL for random variable L, as the adversary which can
freely sample the random variable L.

Experiments

If p is a predicate, then the notation Pr[x

<----

S; y

<----

T; ... : p(x, y, .. . )]

denotes the probability that the predicate p will be true after the ordered sampling of
elements x, y, ... where S and T can be random variables, sets, or algorithms running on
specific inputs.

14

Negligible Functions

Iff : N

---->

IR is a function, we say that f is negligible if for all c,

there is an no such that for all n > no,f(n)

<;c.

Statistical Difference and Entropy
Definition 2.1.1 (Statistical Difference) The statistical difference of two random variables W, W' over a common domain D is defined as SD(W, W') where

SD(W, W') =

~

L

IPr[W = d] - Pr[W' = d] I

'VdEV

Definition 2.1.2 (Entropy) The entropy of a random variable W with pdf p is defined
as:
n

H(W)

=-

LP(Xi) log 2 p(xi)
i=l

Definition 2.1.3 (Min-Entropy) The min-entropy of a random variable W is defined as:

Definition 2.1.4 (Average Conditional Min-Entropy) The average conditional minentropy W given W' is

where lE denotes expectation.
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Definition 2.1.5 ((d, m)-pair) Two distributions W, W' over M are called a (d, m)-pair
if they have the property that the distance between any two points w E W, w' E W' is :::; d
and H00 (W) ~ m and H00 (W') ~ m.

Chapter 3

Hard Learning Problems and
Cryptography
3.1

Introduction

Computational learning theory concerns itself with the ability to learn "concepts", where a
concept is typically represented as a function from a specific domain to a specific range. A
typical computational learning theory problem can be posed as follows:

Typical Learning Theory Problem

Given a set of concept functions C and a set of

representation functions 1t and some information about a selected concept c E C, output a

representation h

E

1t such that h agrees with c on a large enough number of inputs.

The most common source of information about a given c E C are samples, where each
sample is a tuple x, c(x)

+ E where xis sampled from some distribution on the domain of c

and E is some random variable representing noise. An algorithm which learns a concept from
such information can be said to be learning in the probably approximately correct or PAC
model. A learner which learns a function c in the PAC model will with high probability
over the distribution of samples output a representation in h from a class of hypotheses

1t that is a good approximation for the target c

E C.

How well h approximates c and the

probability of success for the learner are both considered parameters of the specific learning
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problem in question. As for the representation class 'H, it is usually assumed that 1t =C.
In many cases though, it is often beneficial to allow C c 1t as a class C may be hard to learn
given only representations in C but may be easy to learn if we allow additional possible
representations. If we allow 7t to be all possible poly-time algorithms, then the learner is
said to be representation-independent.
Some hard learning problems have found uses in cryptographic protocols. The two
most prominent examples of this are the learning parity with noise (LPN) and polynomial

reconstruction (PR) problem. These problems task an algorithm to learn a selected linear
(fixed degree polynomial) function after receiving several noisy samples from the function.
Both problems are thought to be hard to learn, even in a representation-independent sense.
The LPN problem has been used in the HB series of lightweight authenticated protocols as
well as a circular secure encryption system, and the PR problem has been used to implement
a public key encryption system, as well as a commitment scheme and stateful encryption
scheme.
Several difficulties exist in utilizing these, and other learning problems in the creation of
cryptographic protocols. One is that these learning problems are not necessarily hard under
average case assumptions over the concept class. A learning problem is hard if there is no
algorithm that can approximate every concept. Thus, a concept class may be considered
hard to learn, even if an algorithm exists to approximate a great many concepts in that
class. Another difficulty is that a hard learning problem tasks an algorithm to approximate
the function on all points, not just one, and by using a specific representation of that
function. Yet, a cryptographic protocol may be broken if a function is approximated on one
point, or even if it is possible to distinguish one function from another, no matter how this
approximation / distinguishing is done.
As a practical example of these issues, consider a MAC family. A MAC using a secret
key K can be considered as a family of functions MACK, one for each key. Learning the
family of MAC functions in a learning theoretic sense would entail being able to output a
representation of a function MACK, for a random K that approximates MACK well over
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the entire domain, in a sense implicitly recovering the key K for the MAC. On the other
hand, a MAC is broken in a cryptographic sense if one can learn the correct output on
any one given input for a randomly selected MAC function, regardless of how one learns
this output. The use of the PR and LPN problems in cryptographic protocols have had
to overcome these problems, usually by simply assuming average case hardness, and giving
a reduction from the ability to approximate the function on one point, to being able to
approximate the entire function (in a representation independent sense).

Our Results

We extend the ideas previously used to utilize hard learning problems in

cryptography by introducing the idea of adaptive learning. Adaptive learning extends previous work on utilizing learning theory problems in cryptography by tasking an adversary to
approximate the correct output of an adaptively chosen new input, given random samples
of the concept function. It is immediately clear that some sets of functions are hard to
adaptively learn. Consider a secure blockcipher EK as a family of functions indexed by the
key. It is clear that this is a family of functions that are hard to adaptively learn on the
average by the definition of a secure blockcipher, as for a randomly selected function EKi,
even given many adaptively chosen, noise free samples EKi(m), all other inputs EKi(m*)
are pseudorandom. We seek to demonstrate that more natural families of functions are
hard to adaptively learn on average. In that direction, we argue that the learning parity
with noise problem is a hard adaptive learning problem. We extend that assumption to
define the "strong hidden codeword finding problem". We use the SHCF problem as the
basis for constructions of a highly efficient, fully secure authentication protocol, and an
error-correcting, efficient, related key secure MAC.

3.2

LPN, RLD and BF Problems

In this section we introduce some hard learning / coding theory problems.
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Learning parity with noise

Given a random matrix M and a vector z : z = Mx, it is

easy to recover x using standard linear algebra. However, if z

= Mx EB e

where each bit of

e is either 0 or 1, recovering x from z and M may be much harder.
Let p be a fixed probability such that 0 < p < 1/2. Let Bp be the Bernoulli distribution
that outputs 1 with probability p and 0 with probability (1- p). Let Lx,p be the oracle that
when queried returns (a;, x) EB ei where a; is randomly selected from {0, 1}k and

ei +--

Bp-

Definition 3.2.1 (Learning parity with noise problem) Define ADVLPN(A, k,p) to be

Pr[x

+--

{0, 1}k;x1

+--

ALx,p: x'

= x]

We say that the (probability p) learning parity with noise problem is hard if the maximum
advantage ADVLPN(A, k,p) over all A is negligible ink.

Viewed as a learning problem, the learning parity with noise problem is the problem of
learning a parity function, where C is the set of linear parity functions, and 'H =C. This is
because of the fact that if A outputs a vector x'
with probability

-I x, for

a random vector b, (x', b)

-I

(x, b)

! . As such, there is only one vector that will be able to closely approximate

x over random inputs, namely x itself.
The LPN problem allows the adversary to adaptively ask for more samples of the form

(a;, x) EB ei. If we only allow the adversary to non-adaptively specify the number of samples
from Lx,p it receives, the LPN problem becomes the random linear decoding problem for a
code whose size is adaptively selected by the adversary. Let Bp,n be the distribution that
outputs a n-bit vector, each bit being sampled independently from Bp. Let Cx,p,n be the
distribution which, when sampled, outputs (C, z) where C
e

+--

+--

M~ and z = Cx EB e, where

Bp,n· One can consider the distribution Cx,p,n as the distribution which selects a

random [n, k, t] linear error correcting code, and gives a perturbed codeword Cx EB e where
the expected weight of e is pn.
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Definition 3.2.2 (Random linear decoding problem) Define ADVRLo(A, k,p) to be

Pr[x ~ {0, 1}k;q ~ A(1k); (C,z) ~ Cx,p,q;x' ~ A(C,z): x'

= x]

We say that the (probability p) random linear decoding problem is hard if the maximum
advantage ADVRLo(A, k,p) over all probabilistic polynomial-time A is negligible ink where
q ~ A(1 k) is polynomial in k.

It is worth noting that this problem is easy to solve when C and z are from the real
numbers [15]. We will always assume all vectors and matrices are binary in this thesis.
Definition 3.2.3 (Instance of the RLD problem) We define an instance of the RLD
problem as one sample from (C,z) from Cx,p,q·

Note this is an extension of the traditional problem of decoding random linear codes,
in which q is not adversarially chosen. Its is known that the LPN /RLD problems are
NP-Complete. It is thought that the LPN/ RLD problems are hard on average for all p
non-negligibly less than ~· For p negligibly close to ~ the problem is trivial, in that almost
any vector x satisfies the given equations.
The RLD and LPN problems ask the adversary to output the unknown concept vector
x itself. The "bit-finding" problem allows the adversary attempting to learn the parity
function to be representation independent.
Bit-finding problem

The bit-finding problem (or BF problem) is a variant of the prob-

lem of decoding random linear codes, in which the adversary is not asked to reconstruct x,
but is rather asked to find (x, b) for a randomly chosen b.
Definition 3.2.4 (BF problem) Define ADVsF(A, k, p) to be

Pr[x ~ {0, 1}k;q ~ A(1k); (C,z) ~ Cx,p,q;b ~ {0,1}k;z ~ A(C,z, b): z

=

(x, b)]-
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We say that the (probability p) bit-finding problem is hard if the maximum advantage

ADVsF(A, k,p) over all probabilistic polynomial-time (ink) adversaries A where q is polynomial in k, is negligible in k.

If there is an adversary A capable of solving the bit-finding problem, consider the learning

algorithm which on input C,z outputs a circuit C such that C(b)

=

A(C,z, b;r) for some

random coins r. This is an algorithm which solves the representation independent version
of the learning parity with noise problem.
The bit-finding, or HB problem is also known to be equivalent to the learning parity with
noise problem. [31] It is important to note that the fact that the adversary specifies how
many samples he wishes to see in a non-adaptive fashion is not a limiting factor. If there is
a non-adaptive adversary A and an adaptive adversary A' who does not get a sample from
Cx,p,q, but rather is allowed to query Lx,p' A on 1k can output q such that the maximum

running time of A' on problems of size k is less than q. This ensures that A can simulate
Lx,p to A' and as such the advantages are the same.

3.3

SBF Problem

For the bit finding problem an adversary A is tasked to find the output of a randomly
selected target function on a randomly selected point, given some noisy information about
the target function. We can consider adversaries asked to solve an easier problem, namely
given some noisy information about a randomly selected target function find the output of
a selected input.
This idea leads us to describe the SBF problem as follows:
Definition 3.3.1 (Strong BF problem) For an adversary A and non-negligible a define
ADVssF(A, a, k,p) to be IPr[WINssF(A, k,p)]- (1- p- a(k))l, where WINssF(A, k,p) is
defined to be

Pr[x (---- {0, 1 }k; q (---- A(1 k); (C, z) (---- Cx,p,qi (b*

i= 0, z*)

(---- A(C, z) : z*

=

(x, b*)!\ Vi b*

i= [c]i]
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We say that the (probability p) strong bit-finding problem is hard if there exists a
non-negligible a such that the maximum advantage ADVssF(A, a, k, p) over all probabilistic
polynomial-time (in k) adversaries A is negligible in k.

Such an adversary is not solving the underlying learning theory problem in a representationindependent sense as there is no guarantee that A can compute (x, b) for random b. This
definition is a little bit unusual as we would hope to bound the success probability of the
adversary to be negligibly close to

!· As we will see in Section 3.5 this is impossible, so we

bound the success probability to be non-negligibly less than 1- p which is sufficient for our
purposes.

3.4

SHCF problem

With regards to the SBF and BF problems, we bound the adversary's success probability
to be around

!

due to the fact that an adversary which picks a bit at random will solve

both the SBF and BF problems with probability equal to

!.

Since we require that the

security properties of most cryptographic protocols hold with all but negligible probability,
we now deal with the repetition of the BF and SBF protocols, problems where we bound
the adversary's success probability to be negligible.
Let Mc,p,q,n for an-row by k-column matrix C be the distribution where each sample
is a random k-row by q-column matrix A as well as a matrix Z where Z = CA EB E and
where each column of E is an independent sample from Bp,n· We now define the hidden
codeword finding problem as the problem of finding a vector that is "close enough" to the
codeword of a randomly selected word.

Definition 3.4.1 (Hidden codeword finding problem) Define ADVHcF(A, k, n,p, u) to
be

Pr[C

<-

M~; q

<-

A(lk); (A, Z)

<-

Mc,p,q,n; b

<-

{0, l}k; z <- A(A, Z, b):

IICb- zll

:<:;

u]

23
We say that the hidden codeword finding problem is hard, if the maximum advantage

ADV HCF for all probabilistic polynomial time adversaries is negligible in k.
This problem can be seen as solving the "pseudo-repetition" of the BF problem, it being
the "pseudo" -repetition because of the fact that the vectors [a]i are repeated for each vector
[c] 1 This problem is known to be equivalent to the LPN problem [30]. In a similar fashion
to the BF problem, we can consider the pseudo-repetition of the SBF problem which we
call the strong hidden codeword finding problem.

Definition 3.4.2 (Strong hidden codeword finding problem) For an adversary A set

ADVsHcF(A, k, n,p, u) to be

Pr[C

+--

M~; q

+--

A(l k); (A, Z)

+--

Mc,p,q,n; (b*z*) +-- A(A, Z) :Vi b*

i- [a]i and IICb* -z* II :S u]

We say that the strong hidden codeword finding problem is hard, if the maximum advantage for all probabilistic polynomial time adversaries is negligible in k.

Variants of the error distribution

A variant of these problems is when Mc,p,q,n pro-

duces E, where the columns of E do not come from from Bp,q but rather are randomly
selected from

Hf

for some t. Due to the Chernoff bound on the binomial distribution and

the fact that that these problems are considered hard for all 0

< p ::;

~, we may simply pick

p to be small enough such that with overwhelming probability the resulting vector is in
and equivalently we can consider any error pattern vector from

Hf,

Hf to be a sample from Bp,n

for sufficiently small p. Denoting the advantage of an adversary solving the HCF and SHCF
problems where the columns of E are selected randomly from

Hf

as ADVHcFH (A, k, n, t, u)

and ADVsHCFH(A, k, n, t, u) respectively this allows us to show that ADVHcFH(A, k, n, t, u) :S

ADVHcF(A,k,n,p,u) and ADVsHCFH(A,k,n,t,u) :S ADVsHCF(A,k,n,p,u) for some p. Due
to this, in the protocols we construct we will usually draw our error vectors randomly from
the set

Hf and not

from the distribution Bp,n· This will allow us to utilize error correcting
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codes in our protocol constructions which will eliminate false negatives and positives. Note
however that the generator matrix for an error correcting code is usually non-random, while
the matrix Cis uniformly random in the SHCF and HCF problem description. This leads
to the definition of a "randomized" linear code:

Definition 3.4.3 A [n, k, t] randomized linear code is generated by a matrix G = PCX
where P is a random monomial matrix, X is a random invertible matrix and C is a generator
matrix for a [n, k, d] linear code that can efficiently correct t < ~ errors.
We assume that the SHCF problem is hard, even when Cis not uniformly random, but is
rather the generator matrix of a randomized linear code, for some good choice of a matrices
P, C, X. We feel that this is a safe assumption as it is weaker than the assumption made

by McEliece and most other cryptosystems based off of coding theory. They assume that

PCX is random even when G is public, while we only assume that G is indistinguishable
from random when the adversary is only given samples Gb Ef) e.

3.5

Hardness of the SHCF Problem

In this section we discuss the hardness of the SHCF problem. While the hardness of the
HCF problem is known from [30], the assumption that the SHCF problem is hard is a novel
assumption.
On an informal level, the reduction proving the hardness of the HCF problem in [30]
works for any vector b, not just a randomly selected one. Due to the fact that the adversary
cannot select b however, we cannot say that this suffices to show the hardness of the SHCF
problem.
We begin by giving a reduction in one direction from the SHCF to the SBF problem;
specifically we show that if SBF is hard to solve then so is SHCF. This does not result in a
complete proof for the hardness of SHCF, as the hardness of SBF is also an open question.
We spend the rest of the section arguing for the hardness of SBF. Specifically, we begin by
showing that SBF is hard to solve extremely well (that is, with probability near 1) by giving
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a reduction between a strong adversary solving SBF and the LPN problem. Furthermore,
we examine known methodologies for solving the LPN, RLD and bit-finding problems and
show that these cannot be leveraged to attack the strong bit finding problem. Finally, we
show that if the strong bit finding problem is in fact hard, it is hard on average.
We begin by proving a reduction between the SHCF and SBF problems.

Theorem 3.5.1 Let A be an adversary such that ADVsHcF(A, k, n,pn) is non-negligible in
k. Then there exists an adversary A' such that WIN SBF (A', k, p) 2:: 1 - 2p + 2p2 + E1 for some
non-negligible

1

E

•

Proof. Let A be an adversary and let t:(k)

= ADVsHcF(A,k,n,pn)

Let A' be an adversary

that behaves as follows:
On input 1n:
1. Run A(1n) to obtain q. Return q' = Nq.

On input C', z':
1. Let a= 1.

2. Pick a random invertible matrix REM~, let C~ be rows (a- 1)q through aq- 1 of C' .
Let C" = C~R- 1 .
3. Pick a random j
4. For each i

E

<----

{1, ... , n}.

{1, ... , n}, i =/:. j, pick a random bi.

5. Construct Z where [zH for i =/:. j is (bi, [c"] 1) E8 e~ where e~ is 1 with probability p, and where
[z]j

= z~,

where z~ is bits (a- 1)q through aq- 1 of z'.

6. Compute (b*, z*)

<----

A(Z).

7. For l -/(n)J trials, pick a random i =/:. j and count how many times (RTb*, bi) =/:.

zi.

8. If the count is greater than or equal to ,jn(5p/4- p 2 /2), increment a.
If a= N, return _1_, otherwise, go back to step 2.

9. If the count is less than fo(5p/4- p 2 /2), return (b*, zj).
Effectively, A' creates up to N samples from Mc",p,q,n, each time for a new random
matrix C". In each of these samples is an "unknown row" j: for all other rows, A' can
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check the answer A gives. We sample the other rows to determine whether the probability
of a random row is roughly good or bad. If it is good, we use the answer of A in the unknown
row as our answer, otherwise, we try again.
In a given trial, the answer A gives will have some fixed number of errors, all of which
except the one in row j can be checked by A'. With probability

E

(a non-negligible proba-

bility), this number of errors is at most pn. Note that the simulated Z has the exact same
distribution as A expects. Thus, we can imagine that the row j is chosen only after the
adversary gives its answer (b*, z*).
Let

E

be the probability that A' gives a good answer (with at most pn errors) for a

random C and random x. There are two subcases: say EaR is the event that there are at
most pn errors and the jth row is correct, and Eaw is the event that there are at most pn
errors and the jth row is incorrect. Pr[EaR] 2: (1- p)E and Pr[Eaw] ::; pE.
In either case, the probability that the count will be greater than ,fii(5p/4- p 2 /2) is
negligible. We view this count as counting the number of correct rows; we are sampling

J{n) times and looking to see if we get at most (1 - 5p/4

+ p 2 /2}fo

good rows. The

probability that each row we sample is correct is 1 - V:~11 in the case of Eaw and 1 -

rt=T

in the case of EaR·
If X is a random variable determined by counting successes on N biased coins, each of

with is a success with probability P, then

Pr(X ::; P' N) ::; e

N(P-P 1 ) 2

2P

Using this bound, we see that the probability of having a passing count given Eaw is
at least

and the probability of having a passing count given EaR is at least
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y'n(~-~-bJ
1- e

2(1-p-iSJ

In both cases, the probability of not passing the test is negligible (the exponent is
0( yn) with a negative coefficient for sufficiently large n and all p < 1/2). Thus, with
N = ~
attempts, our probability of aborting is negligible.
f

So, we can expect that in some trial, we pass the sampling test and output the jth
bit as our answer. But passing the test does not guarantee that the number of errors is

:S pn. We can prove, however, that the probability of the test passing when there are more
than 3pn/2 - p 2 errors is negligible. In such a case, we use our bound on the cumulative
distribution function of the binomial distribution, with
of a counted failure, and looking for P'

=

?f - If - )n

Pr[Test passed! ~ 3pnj2 errors]

< e
e

vn samples, probability 3p/2- p
1

,

2

we get that the probability is

3p-2p2
y'n(p/4-p 2 /2-1/v'n) 2
3p-2p2

This probability is negligible in n for all p < 1/2. This accounts for all cases where
the probability of a row other than the unknown row being wrong is at least 3p/2. In
particular, this includes all cases where there are more than 3pn/2 errors altogether. So,
we have established:
1. The probability of eventually passing the sampling test is near 1.

2. The probability of passing the sampling test with more than n(3p/2 - p 2 ) errors is
negligible.
Thus, with all but negligible probability, we will output the unknown row in a round
in which (b*, z*) has at most n(3p/2 - p 2 ) errors. So the probability that the output of A'
1

Not P'

=

f!J' - ~,

since having exactly fo(5p/4 - p 2 /2) errors does not pass the test
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is correct is (1 - 3p/2)(1 - v)
for all p
f.

1

1 - 3p/2 + p 2

=

v which is greater than 1 - 7p/4

-

+ 3p2 /2

< 1/2 and sufficiently large n. Thus, A' has a non-negligible advantage, at least

= p/4- p 2 /2,

over 1- 2p + 2p 2 .
D

Theorem 3.5.1 demonstrates that if the success probability of any adversary who tries
to solve the SBF problem can be bounded non-negligibly above 1- 2p + p 2 , then the SHCF
problem should be considered hard. We now give some arguments towards demonstrating
the correctness of that upper bound for the SBF problem. We begin by giving a reduction
proving that the SBF problem cannot be extremely easy to solve.
Theorem 3.5.2 Let A be a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary such that
WINsBF(A,k,p)

=

1-v(k) where vis negligible. Then there exists A' such that

ADVRLD(A', k,p) is non-negligible.
Proof. We define the operation of A'. A' begins by sending 1k to A and receiving q. A then

outputs 2kq. Upon receiving one sample from Cx,p,2kq, (Ctotal, Ztotal), A' takes a random q
rows of Ctatal, denotes that as C and denotes the corresponding rows of Ztotal as z. A' then
randomly selects a k x k matrix R, a matrix C' : C'R = C and returns C', z to A. This
is a valid sample from CRx,p,q because Cx EB e
then return a pair b*, z* such that (b*, Rx)

=

= z*

z

= (C'R)x EB e = C'(Rx) EB e.

A will

with all but negligible probability. Since

(b*,Rx) = (Rxfb* = xTRTb* = (b*fRx = (x,RTb*) we now have the inner product
of a randomly selected vector, (as R was randomly selected), and x. A' then repeats this
procedure with a new set of rows from Ctotal and re-runs A a total of 2k times. Note that
Note that the probability that A returns even one answer that is incorrect is at most 2kv(k),
which is negligible.
The 2k vectors returned by A, b~
overwhelming probability Bx

=

=

Rfbi are k distinct random vectors such that with

z where [b]i

=

b~,

and where the i'th bit of z is

Zi.

With

overwhelming probability, some k of the [b]i will be linearly independent and A' can solve
for x using Gaussian elimination.

29
Thus, ADVRLo(A', k,p) is near 1.

D

The previous theorem allows us to conclude that for all A, WINssF(A, k, p) :::; 1 for some non-negligible

E.

We would like to conclude that WINssF(A,k,p) :::; ~

+v

E

for a

negligible v(k) however we run into a difficulty based on the follow theorem of Blum et al.:

Theorem 3.5.3 Let (C, z) be a sample from

([c]i 1 EB ... EB [c]i,, x) =

Zi 1 EB,

Cx,p,q·

... , E11Zi with probability ~
8

For all sets of indices i1 through i 8 ,

+ ~ (1 -

2p) 8 •

Proof. See [12].

D

Consider an adversary which takes two samples [c]i, Zi, [c]j, Zj and computes [c]i EB

[c]j, Zi EB

Zj

as its answer.

Based on Theorem 3.5.3 this will be right with probability

1 - 2p + 2p2 which is non-negligibly greater than 1/2. This attack however, does not mean
that the SBF problem should be considered "easy" , and this bound is sufficient for the
reduction in Theorem 3.5.1 and our later protocols.
We continue by arguing that there is no attack on SBF that does better than the
above attack by examining a large class of known attacks on the learning parity with noise,
random linear decoding, or bit finding problems. We find that the techniques utilized in
these attacks is also the technique utilized in the BKW algorithm of Blum, Kalai and
Wasserman, as well as many other algorithms for solving the LPN problem or decoding
random linear codes. [25, 16, 28, 12, 42, 27]
These algorithms attempt to find a small number vectors from the sample vectors ci
such that a linear equation c 1 EB c2 EB ... EB

C8 =

c* exists, where c* is equal to a vector

specified by the algorithm. With many independent (or pairwise-independent) equations
being equal to the same c*, this can give us the correct value of a single inner product
with high probability. The algorithms then use these vectors

ci

in some way to find x.

For instance, the attack of [12] on the LPN problem attempts to create the canonical basis
vectors using this process. To solve the SBF problem, we do not need to find a set of specific
solutions c;, (ci, x,) we merely require the label for any one vector c;:. We now show that
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this methodology is incapable of providing a poly-time attack on the strong bit-finding
problem.
Theorem 3.5.4 Let A receive q samples of the form a;, Zi

=

(a;, x) EB ei. The probability

that :3c* such that two linear equations in the a; vectors of size s
where ai 1 EB a; 2 EB, ... ,a;,
Proof.

There are ~f= 1

= c*

and~'

1

EB ... EB ~'

s'

= c*

=

O(polylog(k)) exist

is negligible.

(i) different equations of size up to

s given q samples.

As an

upper bound to the probability, we assume that each equation produces a different value
Cj.

From [51] we can conclude that:

where l = O(polylog(k)) as if l is not poly-logarithmic then q is exponential in k which
makes A exponential in the security parameter. We note that each value produced by the
different equations are pair-wise independent from other values by the uniform selection of
ai. The probability that a pair of equations output the same value c* is 2-k as the vectors
ai are randomly selected and there are s2 218 such equations. Thus the probability that two
equations exist that both equal a vector c* is less

2-k+0( 2polylog(k)s).

If s is logarithmic in

k then this probability is negligible and so we are done.

D

What this shows is that if the adversary's plan of attack against the bit-finding problem
is to gather "votes" for the value of (x, c), by finding equations of values that xor to c, and if
the adversary has only polynomially many samples, then either c will have a short equation
but very likely only one, or c will be the result of multiple equations, but all such equations
will have more than polylogarithmic bi values involved. In the former case, Theorem 3.5.3
shows that the adversary, with a single equation, has probability ~

+ ~(1

- 2p) 8 :<:;

1+

1(1 - 2p) 2 of success. In the latter, each equation gives a negligible advantage over ~' so
the adversary would need to examine exponentially many such colliding equations, an act
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which is impossible for a polynomial-time adversary. This demonstrates that the known
methodologies of gaining information about the unknown parity function are not insufficient
to solve the SBF problem.

Attacking SHCF directly

We can extend this idea of finding linear equations to the

SHCF problem, however given two samples Cii,Zi and a1 ,z1 the probability that JJC(<ii EB
aj)- (zi EB Zj)JJ ~ u, given that JJCai- zill ~ u and JJCai- Zill ~ u is negligible for large
enough nand t. As such, with regards to the SHCF problem we cannot gain any advantage
through this methodology at all, much less amplify the advantage through finding multiple
equations.

Random self-reducibility

In order to support the claim that the SBF problem is useful

for cryptography, we need to justify that it is hard on average. Our arguments so far do not
establish this, but we now show that the SBF problem has some self-reducibility properties
which lend credence to the idea that the SBF problem is hard on average. These arguments
are similar to those in [31].
Lemma 3.5.5 (Random self-reducibility) An instance C, z of the SBF problem can

be transformed into a different random instance of the SBF problem, such that a correct
solution to the resulting problem can translated back to a correct solution of the original.
Proof. Given an instance C, z of the SBF problem we select a random invertible k x k
matrix Rand a matrix C' such that C'R =C. We then select a random vector x' and cast
C', z EB C'x' as the new problem instance. It is clear that this is a sample from

CRxE!lx',p,q

as z EB C'x' = (C'R)x EB e EB C'x' = C'(Rx) EB C'x' EB e = C'(Rx EB x') EB e. Any adversary
solving SBF will return a pair b*, z* such that (b*, Rx EB x')

=

(b*, Rx) EB (b*, x'). As

we know x', and (b*,R) = (x,RTb*) we can compute a correct solution to the original
problem instance as long as the solution given to us is correct.
D
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It should be noted that this is not a random self reduction. The matrix R is invertible,
which means C' is not perfectly random given C.

Theorem 3.5.6 (Uniform hardness) Suppose A is a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary such that Pr[WINssF(A, k, p) IC, z]

> Po for some Po and a non-negligible fraction

of possible C, z tuples. Then there exists a A' such that for every valid C, z

Pr[WINssF(A, k,p)IC, z] >Po·
Proof. Let A' be an adversary which receives an instance of the SBF problem, C, z where

z

=

Cx EB e for some x and e. A' takes n other rows at random and sums them together,

producing a new row of the matrix C'. The corresponding entry

z~

is computed by adding

together the corresponding n bits of z together. The noise rate is now set to be p' =

!-(1- 2p)n+l.

!- -

With non-negligible probability, we can assume that Pr[WINssF(A)IC'z] >Po

Since the "random" instance of the problem utilizes the same secret x vector as the "real"
instance, the solution provided by A is a solution for the instance given to A'.

0

This does not show that the problem is hard on average, just that if it is hard for
some small (but still non-negligible) fraction, it should be hard for almost all instances, an
important fact for the use of this problem in cryptographic protocols. If SBF was hard only
for some non-negligible fraction of instances and not for almost all instances, it may also be
easy for some non-negligible fraction of instances, which could have an impact on its utility
in a cryptographic construction.
An open question is whether or not the SBF problem can be reduced to another known
problem, particularly, whether or not SBF is equivalent to BF or LPN.

3.5.1

Explicit Parameter Selection

We now give some possible bounds on the security gained from selection of the parameters
k, n, u and p of the SHCF problem. By Theorem 3.5.1 we know that solving SHCF must

at least as hard as solving SBF once for a similar parameter selection so we first give
some possible security bounds on the SHCF problem by relating SHCF to solving the
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SBF problem one or more times. Though this a strong assumption we feel it is not an
unreasonable one as the only known methodology we know of to attack the SHCF problem
is through solving SBF, SHCF can be seen as an almost independent repetition of n versions
of the SBF problem, and finally as we've said previously, Theorem 3.5.1 does show that
SHCF is at least as hard as SBF.
We begin with a "worst case" scenario in which the space and time complexity necessary
to solve SHCF is the same as the complexities necessary to solve SBF for similar parameter
choices. In this case to bound the complexity necessary to solve the SHCF problem in the
"worst" case we need to bound the query complexity necessary to solve the SBF problem.
We only know one method of attacking the SBF problem, namely the methodology discussed
in Theorem 3.5.4 which takes many equations of small size in the c vectors that xor to the
same value then takes a majority vote amongst the corresponding bits

zi.

We can estimate

the number of queries necessary to get enough of such equations in the sample vectors with
high probability.
We begin by noting that an adversary obtaining only 2 such "good" equations will
cannot get a greater advantage than an adversary only finding one equation. Given only two
equations that xor to a fixed vector b* and their corresponding bits b1 and b2, we maximize
our success probability if we output b1 if b1

=

b2, and output a random bit b otherwise.

This algorithm's probability of success, when each bit b is correct with probability a, is

2(a)(l- a)!+ a 2 =a which is the probability of success if we just output b1 and ignore b2
entirely. As such we need to find at least 3 equations in the c vectors that xor to the same
value if this methodology even has a chance to work in solving the SBF problem. Let q,
the number of

Ci

vectors be a power of 2 so q

=

21 for some l. For the i'th equation let

Zi

be the corresponding bit.
In general, we can consider the algorithm which searches for a equations of size s or
smaller that xor to the same value, then conducts a majority vote on the corresponding
xor'ed bits. According to Theorem 3.5.4 there are approximately 218 equations of size s
or less given 21 queries. For any given set of a equations where each equation contains at
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least one sample not in any other equation, the probability that they all xor to the same
value is

The probability of finding a equations of size s or less that all xor to

2-(a-l)k.

the same value is approximately

2lsa-(a-I)k.

So for l approximately

a;;} k

we can expect to

find the needed equations. Note that as a increase a~l grows closer to 1. Due to this fact
we can consider an adversary who searches for equations of size O(log(k)) to only require
k

approximately 2 1og(k) equations. While such an adversary reduces the number of queries
it needs, the adversary pays for it in in the increased computation time necessary to find
all the equations of size log(k) or less given

21

queries. There are approximately

2llog(k)

different equations of size log(k) or less given 21 queries, so while the space complexity of
this algorithm is sub-exponential, the time complexity is rather large and in fact is larger
than a brute force attack if llog(k) ::::: k. Note that there is no point in an adversary
searching for equations of size polynomial in k as those equations are indistinguishable
from random values in a statistical sense and thus cannot offer any additional information
to the adversary and in addition the time complexity of such an algorithm would be greater
than a brute force search over values x.
Minimizing the time complexity at the expense of space we can consider the adversary
that searches for equations of size

2

or less. For

21

samples there are

2 21

equations of size

2 and approximately 2218 different sets of s equations. The probability that 3 equations of
size

2

all xor to the same value is

:«;

2- 2 k

as 3 equations of size

2

can all xor to the same

value only when they do not have any vectors in common and as such the probability each
equation xors to a given value is independent from the others. As such, for l approximately

kk we can expect a set of 3 equations of size 2 to exist where each equation xors to the
same value. The adversary must perform around 221 computations to find these equations,
far fewer than

2log(k).

Note that more than 3 equations of size

2

will be needed to have the

success probability of this adversary be close to 1 - p so this is only a lower bound on the
space complexity of this algorithm.
In our worst case scenario, n has no impact on the security of SHCF. A more reasonable
assumption is that solving SHCF problem through solving SBF requires us to solve SBF
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multiple times. While we have no algorithm that solves SHCF through solving SBF once
and once only, we can give a hypothetical SBF solver that can be used n times to solve
SHCF. Consider an adversary A that can solve SBF given q queries for some fixed vector
b*. Such an adversary is much stronger than what is necessary to solve the SBF problem,

but has not been completely ruled out by our proofs. One can then build an adversary A'
to solve SHCF by splitting up the matrix A and the vectors [zJi into separate, independent
instances of the SBF problem. By giving each instance to A A' receives

n bits z;

where

each bit is the inner product (8.i, Cj) with probability close to (1- p). We can then expect
(1- p)n bits to be "correct" and as such z*
SHCF problem for u

~

= (zi, z:2, · · · , z~)

will be a valid answer for the

pn pn. This increases the time complexity of solving SHCF by a

multiplicative factor of n. It may increase the space complexity by a multiplicative factor
of n as well, depending on whether or not the SBF problem can reuse the same sample
vectors 8.i for reach invocation of the SBF solver.
We gain much larger improvements in our security guarantees if the adversary solving
SBF returns different vectors b* over different problem instances C, z. If that is the case
then we must solve SBF enough times to get solutions using the same vector b*. In an
extreme case, A solves SBF and outputs a random vector b* over each separate problem
instance. This adds a very large order of magnitude to the complexity of solving SHCF as
compared to solving SBF. Overall, while our lower bound on query complexity is not that
high there are good reasons to believe that the actual security given by practical attacks
will be higher.
While informal, this analysis demonstrates that solving SHCF is at least as hard as
solving the LPN problem for similar parameters, and the possibility exists that it is much
harder.

Chapter 4

Applications of the SHCF Problem
In this section we demonstrate the utility of adaptive learning and of the SHCF problem by
giving an efficient RFID authentication protocol as well as an efficient related key secure
MAC. The security of both primitives is proven by reductions to the SHCF problem.

4.1

hCAP protocol

In this section we give a construction of an RFID authentication protocol which is fully
man-in-the-middle secure based off of the SHCF and LPN problems, efficient, and which
has no false acceptance rate. Our security model is very similar to [34] and is stronger than
the security model of the HE# protocol[30].
We define an RFID authentication protocol is a triple of algorithms Tag, Reader, Output.
A tag's private information consists of a key K from a keyspace K and a state S from a
state space S; the reader maintains a list of triples of tag identifier, key and current state.
An RFID authentication protocol runs as follows. We assume there is a fixed number of
rounds n, and construct a transcript Ta = a1, b1, ... , an, bn, where a is a unique session ID,
ai denotes the ith message from the reader and bi denotes the ith message from the tag.

We insist that the reader's message is the first message since RFID chips do not typically
contain their own power sources and thus cannot send a message without receiving one from
the reader first. Tag on input ai outputs bi, and Reader initially outputs a1, and on input bi
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outputs ai+l· Output is run by the reader once the protocol is complete, and outputs either
.l, indicating rejection, or a tag identifier from its list. Note that Reader, Tag and Output

have access to the current partial transcript of ai, bi values at all times.
Definition 4.1.1 (Accurate) We say an RFID protocol is accurate if when the reader
interacts with a tag

7i

with state S and key K and where the reader has (K, S, i) in its list,

the probability that Output outputs i is 1.

Definition 4.1.2 (Un-Forgeability) An adversary A is considered to have broken the
unforgeability property of an RFID protocol P if ADVuNFORG(A, q, t) is non-negligible in
q and where q is non-negligible in the key length, and where ADVuNFORG(A, q, t) is the
probability that an adversary takes time t, interacts q times, and succeeds in the following
game:
1. A tag T is set up with a key K

+--

K and state S

+--

S, and the reader R is set up

with a list of triples (K, S, 0).
2. In the first phase, the tag and reader execute the authentication protocol q times, where
A is allowed to change any message from the reader to the tag, and vice versa, as well

as seeing if the resulting protocol transcript Ta is thought to be valid by the reader
(Output(Ta) =j..L}.

3. In the second phase, the reader begins a single new protocol session with the adversary.
Let r; be the resulting transcript between the adversary and the reader. The adversary
wins if Output(T;) :j.l and if r; involves at least one message change: that is, there
exists some i for which the reader sends ai to the adversary but the adversary sends
a;:

=I ai

to the tag, or the tag sends bi to the adversary but the adversary sends bi

=I bi

to the reader.

Definition 4.1.3 (Anonymity) An adversary A is considered to have broken the anonymity
of an RFID protocol P if ADV ANON(A, q, t) is non-negligible in q and where q is nonnegligible in the key length and where ADVANON(A, q, t) is the probability that an adversary
takes time t, interacts q times, and succeeds in the following game:
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1. Two tags

7i, To are set up each with a key randomly selected from /( and a state

randomly selected from S, and triples for each tag are given toR.
2. A is allowed full man-in-the-middle access between the readers and the tags
3. A random bit b is flipped. A can now interact with
q" additional times {where q

4.

= q' + q")

'4, the other tag Tr, and the reader

.

A outputs a bit b' and succeeds if b' = b.

Definition 4.1.4 (Fully secure) An RFID protocol is fully secure if it is accurate, anonymous and unforgeable.

4.2

hCAP construction

We now give our construction of a fully secure RFID protocol. Our construction requires
the use of a pairwise independent hash function family 7-l. These functions families are
extremely efficient to implement and as such are suitable for RFID tags.

Definition 4.2.1 A set of functions 7-l where each function hy

E

7-l maps k bits to m(k)

bits is considered a pairwise independent hash function family if Vm, m' E { 0, 1 }k, VT, T1 E

{0, l}m(k), Pry[hy(m') =

T

1

A hy(m) =

T]

= 2 2~(k) •

For our protocols we do not actually require that the probability in the above experiment
is exactly

22 ~(k), we merely require that it is negligible in

k.

We can now give our construction of a fully secure RFID protocol. Let 7-l be a pairwise
independent hash function family that takes 2n + k bits as input and uses a k bit key. Each
tag T receives as a key two matrices C, C' which are generator matrices for randomized
[n, k, t]linear codes.
• Initially, Reader sends a random k-bit message a to the tag.
• Tag(a): Compute {3
Return

T

= Cy EB e and

= hy({3,{3',a),

{3, and {3'.

{3'

= C'y EB e' where y .._. {0, l}k and e,e' .._.Hr.

39
• Output( a, {3, {3', T): For each tag in its list, the reader knows D and D'. The reader

hy({J, {3', a) =

=

If y

attempts to decode {3 using D and {3' using D'.

D({J)

=

D'({J'), and if

output the id of this tag. If this does not succeed for any tag,

T,

output L
Before proving the security of our construction, we state some necessary theorems. The
first theorem is that for a random linear code, random biased codewords are indistinguishable from random vectors.
Theorem 4.2.2 Let A' be a distinguisher such that:

IPr[C

f-

M~; (A, Z)

f-

for some non-negligible

Mc,p,q,n: A'(A, Z)

E

= 1]-Pr[A,

f-

MX,; Z

f-

Mit; A'(A, Z) = 1]1 2: E(k)

and where p, q, n are all polynomial ink. Then there exists A such

that A can solve the LPN problem.
To do this, we need to use the following theorem from [36]:
Theorem 4.2.3 Let A' be a distinguisher such that:

Pr[x

f-

{0, 1}k; (C, z)

for non-negligible

E.

f-

Cx,p,q; A'(C, z)

= 1]- Pr[C

f-

M~; z

f-

{0, 1}q; A'(C, z) = 1] 2:

E

Then there exists an A such that A can solve the LPN problem.

We now prove Theorem 4.2.2
Proof. We first define the hybrid hi as the pair A, Z where for 1

[z]~

=

([c]j, [ajl) EB

e{

fore{

f-

Bp and for alll such that i

<l ~

~

l

~

i, for 1

~

j

~

n

q, [zl{ is random. By this

definition hi is the hybrid where the first i-1 columns of Z are correctly produced according
to the Mc,p,q,n distribution and the remaining columns are random bits. As such, we have
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that ho is equivalent to the case where the matrix Z is random, while hn is equivalent to
the case where Z is produced by Mc,p,q,n· By the hybrid lemma we must have that if A'
can distinguish between the two experiments in Theorem 4.2.2 it can distinguish between
hs and hs+l for some s. We can now construct AA' (C, z) to distinguish between the two

experiments in Theorem 4.2.3.
We construct A" =A A', a distinguisher to meet the conditions of Theorem 4.2.3. First,
A" selects a random k by s - 1 bit matrix A. A" then constructs a matrix Z such that for
1:::; j < n, 1:::; l < s, [z]~

= ([c] 1, [ajl) EB e~ where

e{

<--

Bp, for l

=

s, [z] 1 = z and for l

> s,

[zJ; is random. If z is a random vector, then A" has just created the hybrid h 8 , otherwise
it has just created hs+l· Give A, Z to A' and return its result.
Since A' can distinguish between the two hybrids, A" is a distinguisher as required in
Theorem 4.2.3. Thus, there is an A 111 that can solve the LPN problem.

D

Theorem 4.2.2 allows us to prove the following theorem which shows that random words
remain pseudorandom, even given their error prone encoding under a random linear code.
Theorem 4.2.4 For all probabilistic polynomial time adversaries A we have that:

IPr[A(A, Z)

for some negligible v where A, Z

R

<--

= 1]- Pr[A(R, Z) = 1]1 :::; v(k)

<--

Mc,p,q,n for random n by k bit matrix C and where

M%.

Proof. This proof comes from Theorem 4.2.2 as well as the following four hybrids:

• Hybrid 1: A, Z where A, Z

<--

Mc,p,q,n·

• Hybrid 2: A, U where A, Z

<--

Mc,p,q,n, U

• Hybrid 3: R, U where R

M%, U

<--

• Hybrid 4: R, Z where A, Z

<--

<--

<--

M;;.

<--

M%.

M;;.

Mc,p,q,n, R
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It is easy to see that Hybrids 2 and 3 are indistinguishable as U is independent of A and

R. Hybrids 1 and 2 are indistinguishable by Theorem 4.2.2. Finally, if hybrids 3 and 4 are
distinguishable, note that this gives us a distinguisher that can distinguish between "valid"
codewords and random vectors, without having access to the associated words, (the matrix

A). If this is possible, we can construct a distinguisher A' for Theorem 4.2.2 by ignoring A
and replacing it with a random matrix R.

D

We can now prove the security of our RFID protocol. We begin with the unforgeability
game.
Theorem 4.2.5 The hCAP protocol is unforgeable.

Proof. Let ai be the reader's message to the adversary in the ith execution of the protocol
and let a; be the ith message from Ato the tag. Let (3i, f3I, Ti be the tag's response to a;
and let f3i, f3I*, Tt be the ith message from A to the reader. We give a reduction taking
any adversary A that during any round of the protocol can create a new f3i, f3;*, Tt such
that Output(ai, f3i, f3I*, Tt) ~l.., even given f3i, f3I, Ti, to an adversary solving the SHCF
problem. To begin, note that if Output(ai, f3i, f3:*, Tt) ~l.. then it must be the case that
D((Ji) = D'(f3;*).

A', given A, Z from Mc,p,q,n creates a generator matrix for another randomized linear
code C'. To simulate the first message from the reader during the i'th execution of the
protocol, A' returns a random string ai. To simulate the i'th message from the tag, on
input a; A' selects a column [a] 1 from A, sets f3i
and Ti

= h[a]l ((3i,

=

[zjl, f3;

=

C'[ajl E9 e1 where e1

+---

7-if

f3;, a;). To simulate the output of the reader on the ith execution of the

protocol, A' outputs the tag id if ai

= a;, f3i = f3i, f3I = f3;*, and Ti = Tt, otherwise A'

outputs 1...
A' picks a random index i in [1, q], simulates the unforgeability game for A, and waits
for A to produce its answer f3i, f3;*, Tt in the ith execution of the protocol (whether in the
first or second phase of the game). A' decodes to learn y;

=

D' ((3;*) and returns (y;, (3i).
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Note that the simulation of the unforgeability game is perfect up until the point where
the adversary first produces ({3*,{3'*,7*) which is different from ({3,{3',7) (or for a different
a*), such that Output( a, {3*, {3'*, 7*) would be

#_i. The idea is that we are randomly selecting

i and hoping that the first time this occurs, it is in round i. Given that the adversary is

successful, we are correct about i with probability ~.
There are four cases:
In the first case, (ai,f3i,f3~,7i)

= (a'[,f3;,f3:*,7t).

In this case, the answer A' gives is

incorrect because Yi is not a new word.
In the second case, a;, f3;, {3:*

= ai, f3i, {3: but 7t i= 7i·

In this case we know that 7t is not a

valid tag for ai, f3i, {3:, (as the valid tag for ai, f3i, {3: is 7i) and as such Output(ai, f3;, {3:*, 7t)

=_l_

with probability 1.
In the third case (a;,f3;,f3:*)

i= (ai,f3i,f3D,

but Yi

=

Yj for some j ~ i. In this case,

we know that A only has a negligible chance of selecting the "correct" 7t

= hy'[ (f3;,

{3:*, ai)

due to the pairwise independence of the hash function family and the fact that, since ai is
randomly selected by the reader, f3;, f3:*, ai must be a new input.
Finally, if for all 1 ~ j ~ i we have that D(f3;)

=

D' ({3:*)

i= D({Jj)

then Yi

=

D' (f3:*) is

new. That is, A' has never seen a codeword for Yi under C. Thus, the output (Yi, f3n is a
correct answer for A' whenever D({Jn

=

D'({J:*).

Thus, if A is successful with non-negligible probability

E

then with probability

E/q

A

makes its first correct and distinct response in round i. Until that point, A' perfectly
simulates the unforgeability game. In this case, we have shown that with all but negligible
probability, A' produces a correct output. Thus, A' is correct with non-negligible probability

E/q,

which contradicts the SHCF assumption.

D

Theorem 4.2.6 The hCAP protocol is anonymous.

Proof sketch. By Theorem 4.2.2 we know that the f3i, {3: vectors produced by the tag are
pseudorandom, even given 7i, a, and Yi· As such, each message consists of two pseudorandom
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codewords /3, (3' and a correct

T:

an adversary distinguishing the tags in an anonymity attack

would directly defeat this pseudorandomness.

0

Theorem 4.2. 7 The hCAP protocol is accurate.

Proof sketch. The accuracy of the hCAP protocol comes directly from its unforgeability.
If the hCAP protocol is not accurate, then a reader interacting with a tag

Ti will output

something other than Ti. It will not output .l as Ti is a valid tag, so all steps of Output
will pass when the reader tests tag Tj. If with non-negligible probability the reader outputs
another tag identifier j

-I i

then with non-negligible probability the reader cannot tell the

difference between two tags that have randomly generated keys. As such, to impersonate a
tag Ti an adversary need only create its own tag with its own random key.

4.3

0

hCAM Protocol and construction

We now construct hCAM, a very efficient related-key secure MAC whose security is based
off of the SHCF problem.
The construction of hCAM is based off the hCAP protocol described earlier. The main
observation is that in the earlier RFID protocol, the fact that the

ai

selected by the reader

during the second phase of the unforgeability test was random is never utilized in the
unforgeability proof. We only required that

ai

is different than all previous vectors selected

by the reader. As such, we consider the notion of using

ai

as a the message, and the tag's

response to the reader as the tag of ai in our MAC construction.
Definition 4.3.1 (Related-key secure MAC) A MAC which is related-key secure under~

is a trio of functions KeyGen, MAC, Verify that possess the following properties:

KeyGen(l k) returns a key K.
MAC(m, K) returns a tag

T.
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Verify( m, T, K) returns a bit, such that Verify( m, MAC( m, K), K)
Related-key unforgeability: VA
AFMAC(

,KJ,K :

FMAC(·,K),K

8E

Verify(m, r, K)
returns

T

=

E

PPT, 3v negligible: Pr[K

= 1.
KeyGen(1k); m, T

+--

+-

1/\A never queried F on (m, <5) for any <5] :"::: v(k) where

= MAC(m, 8(K)) on input (m, <5) for a perturbation function

~.

We now restate our previous construction as a related-key strongly secure MAC. Let 1t
be a pairwise independent hash function family which takes 2n + k bits as input and uses
a key of length k.
MAC Construction
KeyGen(1 k)

= C, C',

where C, C' are generator matrices to randomized [n, k, t]linear

codes.
MAC(m, C, C') treats mas a vector m, selects a random y

f3 = Cy EB e, (3' = C'y EB e' where e, e'

+--

E

Hf. Return (3, (3' and

{0, 1}k and computes
T

= hy((J, (3', m).

Verify(m, (3, (3', T, C, C') decodes f3 using D and (3' using D'. If either does not decode,
or D((J) -1- D((J') reject otherwise take y = D((J) and see if hy((J, (3', m) =

T.

If it does

accept, if it does not reject.
Theorem 4.3.2 The above construction is a ~EEl related-key secure MAC where

bz(x)

~EEl=

{bz:

= x EB z}.

Proof. We give a reduction between any adversary A who can forge with success probability
E

given q' queries to MAC and q" queries to Verify, to an adversary A' that solves the SHCF

problem. A' begins by selecting a random index l between 1 and q"

+ 1.

We first show how A' can simulate the function MAC. Let A, Z be the matrices A'
receives from Mc,p,q,n· Let C' be the matrix for another randomized linear code. When
A makes a query to

FMAC(·,K),K

of the form mi, bi, <5: (where bi, <5: are n by k matrices), A'

selects a column l of A and the corresponding column of Z. A' sets Yi = [ajl,

fJ;

= [z] 1 and
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computes {3i

=

f3i E9 8iyi, {3~

= C'yi EB 8'yi EB e', Ti = hy({3, {3', m)

and returns m, {3, {3', T to

A. It is obvious that this is the correct MAC of m under the key C E9 8, C' E9 8'.
To simulate Verify, A' when receiving a message tag pair m 1, ({31 , f3j, Tj) from A checks
to see ifthere was a MAC query j made by A such that (mj,{3j,{3j,Tj)
there was, A returns 1, if there is not, A' returns

=

(mi,{3i,{3~,Ti)· If

_l_.

If l ::::; q" this process continues until the l'th verification query. Then A' decodes {3{

using D', obtaining Yl, and then checks to see if Yl
different, A' outputs Yl, f3t otherwise A fails. If l =

-I Yj for all YJ generated by A'. If Yl is
q" + 1 then A' waits until A produces a

forgery m*, {3*, {3~, T* and checks to see if D' ({3~) is a new key y * and outputs y *, {3* if so.
The idea here is that A' is hoping to select the first message tag pair given by A that would
successfully verify. At least one such pair must exist with probability at least

f

and A' will

select that message/ tag pair with probability at least q"~l.
We now show conditioned on A''s selection of the first message tag pair that would
successfully verify, its answer is correct with overwhelming probability. Let m 1, ({31, {3{, Tt)
be the pair selected by A'. If D(f3t)

= D'(f3f) =

= Yj = D({3j) = D(f3j) for some

Yl

previous {31 ,{3j then with overwhelming probability Tt

-I hy1 (f3t,f3{,mt)

due to the pairwise

independence of the hash function family. As such, we must have that D'(f3f)

=

Yl

all previous Yj· Since this is a valid message tag pair, we must also have that Yl

-I Yj
=

for

D(f3t)

and thus Yl, f3t is a valid answer to the SHCF problem.
0

It is interesting to note how we gain related key security in our MAC construction. Our

MAC is related key secure in that it has a certain type of related key insecurity. Namely,
we find that for a given message, nonce and tag tuple under one key, it is easy to find valid
tags for that message and nonce under any chosen offset of the key.
Also note that this is a very Fiat-Shamir like methodology of taking an authentication
protocol and turning it into a message authentication scheme. Note that the Fiat-Shamir
heuristic requires a 3-round protocol where the second round message is random. Our
protocol is two rounds, but note that the 2nd round of the protocol does require the prover
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the ability to create some randomness y and use that randomness to respond to message a
from the reader (verifier).

Chapter 5

Fuzzy Sketches and Fuzzy
Extractors
5.1

Introduction

The practical utilization of cryptographic protocols often requires the distribution and
storage of secret keys.

Keys must contain a high level of entropy, yet must be easily

and accurately reproducible. However, generating randomness is expensive and the storage/reproduction of said randomness may be extremely difficult, especially when human
beings are involved. High entropy keys are hard to remember, while low entropy keys
may render a protocol insecure, regardless of any security guarantees that protocol possess.
While the ability for humans to produce and remember high entropy strings may be small,
there is a plethora of easily accessible information that while containing a some entropy
is not uniformly random, or unreliably reproduceable, or both, a good example being biometric information. Because of this, an important question is how to create cryptographic
primitives and protocols that utilize biased or unreliable sources to create and store keys.
A secure sketch provides a "sketch" of a secret value in such a way that the sketch reveals
little information about the secret, yet allows for the secret to be recovered from any "close"
secret. A fuzzy extractor allows two parties with noisy secrets to agree on a random value
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even over an insecure error-prone channel.
Building from the original ideas of Dodis, Reyzin and Smith, several new security properties of sketches have been introduced. A sketch is reusable if many sketches of the same
secret do not reveal any additional information about that secret, and a sketch is robust if
an adversary cannot create a new given valid sketch of a secret after seeing a single example.

Our Work

A question that is not answered by previous work is whether or not these

properties can exist in the same sketch construction. To analyze this we propose the idea of
a strongly robust sketch. We show that the ideal conception of a reusable robust sketch where
all the security properties have statistically strong guarantees is impossible. A reuseable
sketch will not be strongly robust against an unbounded adversary. We go on however,
to leverage our results in the previous chapter in order to give constructions that allow a
computational form of robustness under multiple queries, while preserving the statistical
reusability property. In addition, we demonstrate the utility of strongly robust sketches by
showing how these sketches can be used to add new security properties to cryptographic
protocols by hardening them against related key attacks. This results in showing that not
only does a related-key secure MAC imply a strongly-robust fuzzy extractor, but such a
fuzzy extractor implies the existence of a related key secure MAC.

5.2

Definitions

In this section we give the various definitions of fuzzy sketches and fuzzy extractors found
in previous literature.
A sketch is a method of securely storing a value w such that it can be recovered by a
user as long as the user knows w' which is "close" to w [22].

Definition 5.2.1 An (m, m', d) sketch is defined by two algorithms Gen and Rec which have
the following properties:
For all random variables W where H 00 (W) 2: m we have H 00 (WIGen(W)) 2: m'.
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For all w, w' such that llw- w'll::::; d, Rec(w, Gen(w')) = w'.

From the definition alone, a secure sketch may not be sufficient when the adversary
knows many sketches Gen(w; r). However, a reusable sketch introduced by Boyen [13], hides
the secret w even when given many sketches of w and when the adversary is allowed to
choose adaptive perturbations of the input.

Definition 5.2.2 A (m, m', d)-sketch is A-reusable if the probability of winning in the following game is ::::; 2-m' for all adversaries A.

Preparation: The adversary sends to the challenger the specification of a random
variable W.

Randomization: The challenger samples w from W.
Queries: The adversary may present to the challenger an arbitrary number of queries
of the form Oi E A for a perturbation Oi. The challenger runs Gen(oi(w))

=

Pi and

returns Pi to the adversary.

Test: The adversary selects a word w* and wins if w = w*.
When A is clear from context or unimportant we will simply call a sketch reusable.
Unless specifically stated, we will usually assume that A is the family of functions where
Oi(x) = x EB i.
We also note that, due to the fact that we allow A to be computationally unbounded,
this definition implies that H 00 (wi{Po, P1, · · · , Pq} ~ m', where {Po, P1, · · · , Pq}· is the set
of all sketches given to A from the above game.
We gain the following theorem from [13, 22]:

Theorem 5.2.3 (Reuseable Sketch Construction) Let C be an [n, k, t]linear code. Let
Gene(w;r) be defined by r

<---

{0, 1}k,p =Gene= wEB C(r). Let Rece(w',P) be defined as

P EB C(D(w' EB P)). Then Gene and Rece are a reusable fuzzy sketch.
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We note that from [13] that this sketch reveals the same information about w as the
deterministic linear sketch Hw, the syndrome sketch of Dodis et al. [21]. We note that
in general, a deterministic linear sketch can be trivially shown to be reusable under vector
addition as one cannot get multiple sketches of the same secret and all sketches of perturbed
values are computable given a non-perturbed sketch due to linearity.
Neither the definition of a sketch nor the definition of a reusable sketch preclude the
adversary from modifying sketches. A sketch is said to be robust if no adversary can produce
a (new) valid sketch after observing one valid one.

Definition 5.2.4 An (m, m', d, v) robust sketch is an (m, m', d) sketch such that Rec(w, P)
can output

j_

and that the maximum advantage, ADV-ROBUST(A, Gen, Rec) over all ad-

versaries and (d, m) -pairs is ::::; v, where the advantage is defined as the probability that A
succeeds in the following game:

Setup: w

+--

W, w'

+--

W' where W and W' is a (d, m) -pair.

Challenge: A receives P
Test: A(P) outputs P*

"I-

= Gen(w).
P and wins if Rec(w',P*)

-=f-j_.

We note that, similar to the definition of reusability, a robust sketch provides security
assurances against unbounded adversaries.
A strong extractor enables the "extraction" of randomness from an imperfectly random
source.

Definition 5.2.5 An (n, m', l, E)-strong randomness extractor is a polynomial time randomized algorithm Ext : {0, 1}n x {0, 1}

----> { 0,

1}1 such that for any random variable W

over {0, 1}n with min-entropy m' it holds that SD((Ext(W; Us), Us), (Ut, Us)) :'S:

E

where Us

is the uniform distribution on s bits.

Definition 5.2.6 An (n, m', l, E)-strong extractor is linear if Ext(w EB x; i)
Ext(x; i) for all i.

Ext(w; i) EB
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A fuzzy extractor combines the ideas of a fuzzy sketch and a strong extractor. A fuzzy
extractor allows for the reproduction of a random string R given a public sketch and an
imperfectly random, imperfectly reproducible string w. The standard construction of fuzzy
extractors utilizes fuzzy sketches [22].

Definition 5.2. 7 A (m, l, d, E) fuzzy extractor is given by two algorithms, Fsk and Rep with
the following properties:
1. Fsk is a probabilistic algorithm that on input w
(R,P) such that SD((R,P), (UL.P))::::;

<----

W where H 00 (W) 2": m produces

E.

2. Rep( w', P) = R is the reproduction procedure with the property that, \fw, w'

w'll::::; d and (R, P)

<----

Fsk(w), we have Rep(w', P)----> R.

We should note that the only "public" output of Fsk is the value P.

Fsk( w)

= (R, P)

llw -

We say that

to denote the idea that R is associated with w. In the future we consider

Fsk(w) to output the public value P only.
The notion of a "reusable" fuzzy extractor follows directly from the idea of a reusable
sketch:

Definition 5.2.8 A (m, l, d, ~.E) reusable fuzzy extractor is a (m, l, d, E) fuzzy extractor
such that for all state-preserving adversaries A and for all random variables W such that

H 00 (W) 2": m, for all i,

SD( (~,Po, ... , Pq), (Ut, Po, ... , Pq)) ::::;
where w

<----

E,

W, Po= Gen(w), and for each i, Pi= Gen(oi(w)) where Oi

<----

A(P1, · · · , Pi_ I),

and where q is the number of perturbations A chooses to specify before halting.
We may similarly define the notion of a robust fuzzy extractor, however there are some
additional considerations which need to be considered. Namely, does the adversary just
receive a sketch P, or does an adversary receive a sketch P and the resulting key R?
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The first notion is known as "pre-application" robustness, the second "post-application"
robustness.

Definition 5.2.9 (Pre-Application Robust Fuzzy Extractor) A (m, l, d, E)-fuzzy extractor is A-pre-application robust if the maximum advantage ADV -ROBUST( A) over all A
is :::; A, where ADV -ROBUST(A) is defined as the probability that the adversary succeeds in
the following game:

Setup:

The challenger samples w from W and w' from W' where W, W' are a

(d, m)-pair, and produces (P, R)

Test:

=

Fsk(w).

A(P) outputs P* and wins if Rep(w', P*)

~..1.

and P*

~

P.

A fuzzy extractor is "post-application" robust if the adversary receives P and R in the

Test phase of the above game.
It should be noted that in all the definitions so far, reusability and robustness apply
to all adversaries A, not just computationally bounded adversaries. One can consider the
notions of computational reusability and robustness where these properties only hold against
polynomial time adversaries as well.

5.3

Combining Reusability And Robustness

The previous literature on fuzzy sketches does not consider robustness under multiple
queries, nor does it consider whether or not reusability and robustness can be combined in
a meaningful sense. To investigate combining these two properties we define the notion of
a strongly robust sketch and a strongly robust extractor.

Definition 5.3.1 (Strong Robustness Advantage) Define A's success probability in the
following game with a sketch (Gen, Rec) as ADV-ROBUST'(A, Gen, Rec, .6.).
Setup: Two values are sampled from a (d, m) pair, w ,__ W, w' ,__ W'.
Queries: Fori= l...q, A selects a bi

E

.6., and receives Gen(bi(w)) =Pi.
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Test: A(P1, P2, ... , Pq) outputs P*, o* where Vi P*

i- Pi

and wins ifRec(o*(w'), P*) of-1_.

With the previous definitions in mind, we formally define the notion of both a statistically
strongly robust sketch as well as a strongly robust sketch. The difference is that the former

is strongly robust against an unbounded adversary, while the latter is only computationally
strongly robust.
Definition 5.3.2 An (m, m', d, 6., v) statistically strongly robust sketch is an (m, m', d)
sketch where for all A and all (d,m) pairs, ADV-ROBUST'(A, Gen, Rec,f::l.) is~ v.

Definition 5.3.3 An (m, m', d, 6., v) strongly robust sketch is an (m, m', d) sketch where
for all probabilistic, polynomial-time A and for all (d, m) pairs, ADV -ROBUST'(A, Gen, Rec, 6.)
is

~

v.

We can extend the notion of a strongly robust sketch to that of a strongly robust 'fuzzy
extractor.
Definition 5.3.4 An (m, l, d, 6., E, v) strongly pre-application robust fuzzy extractor is an
(m, l, d, 6., E) reusable fuzzy extractor such that the maximum advantage ADV -ROBUST/e-pre
(A, Fsk, Rep, 6.) ~ v. We define ADV-ROBUST/e-pre(A, Fsk, Rep, 6.) as the maximum probability over all (d, m)-pairs of A succeeding in the following game:
w .._ W, and w' .._ W' for a (d,m) pair W, W'.

Setup:
Queries:

For i

= 1, ... , q,

A(P1, · · · , Pi-d makes a query Oi

E

6. and receives Pi

where (Pi,~)= Fsk(oi(w)).

Test:

A outputs P* and succeeds if Rep(w', P*) of-1_ and P*

i- Pi

for any i.

We would like to define a post-application robust fuzzy extractor to be an extractor such
that for each query made by the adversary, he receives both the sketch Pi and the resulting
key

~.

We note however, that this security definition is impossible to meet. Namely,

since each key

~

is an extraction on the secret w, it is easy to show that each such good

extraction must reduce the min-entropy of w by at least one bit. As such, given enough
keys the adversary can reproduce w and thus break robustness.
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Definition 5.3.5 An (m, l, d,

~' E,

v) strongly post-application robust fuzzy extractor is an

(m, l, d, ~' ~:) reusable fuzzy extractor such that the maximum advantage ADV -ROBUST/e-post
(A, Fsk, Rep,~) :::; v, where we define ADV-ROBUST/e-post(A, Fsk, Rep,~) as the maximum
probability over all (d, m)-pairs of A succeeding in the following game:
Setup and Test are as in Definition 5.3.4.
Queries:

Fori= 1, ... , q, A can make two types of queries, key queries and sketch

queries. For a sketch query A specifies 8i and receives Pi where (Ri, Pi)
When A makes a key query he can either give a 8i E

~

<---

Fsk(8i(w)).

and receive (Pi, R;) where

(Pi, R;) = Fsk(8i(w)) or specify an j and receive Rj where (Rj, Pj)

<---

Gen(8j(w)) and

where 8j is a previous sketch query made by A. A can make as many sketch queries
as he wishes, but only one key query.

5.4

General Impossibility Results

In this section we prove several impossibility results. Specifically, we show that it is impossible to construct a keyless or logarithmic-key, statistically strongly robust sketch under
"reasonable"

~.

Our impossibility results easily extend to show that it is impossible to

construct keyless or logarithmic-key strongly (pre-application) robust fuzzy extractors for
such

~

that are strongly robust against unbounded adversaries.

Specifically we consider a set of perturbations
AC

~

~

to be reasonable if: (1) There is a

such that A is a group of isometric permutations, that is, permutations 8 such that

llw- w'll

=

ll8(w)- 8(w')ll, and (2) there is a 81 E A such that for all x, llx- 81 (x)ll

We feel these assumptions represent any reasonable choice for
allow general types of functions in

~

~.

=

1.

Boyen notes that if we

it may impossible to design reusable sketches. As

an example, consider the family of functions 8i,x where for i

=

1, · · · , n, 8i,x (w) = x if the

i'th bit of w is 0, a random value otherwise. The code offset sketch mentioned earlier in
Theorem 5.2.3 can easily be shown not to be reusable against such a family of functions yet
is known to be reusable against vector addition

mod 2. Because of this limitation, Boyen
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restricts his observations about reusable sketches to sets of perturbations D. that contain
a group of isometric permutations. As for the existence of
ability to specify

P,

recall that the adversary's

oE D. to apply to w is meant to be a worst-case emulation of variance in

w; as such, it would be unreasonable to expect that a low-difference perturbation such as

o1 cannot be specified.
We first give a review of results originally developed by Boyen [13]. Let Gen*(w) be the
set {P: 3r: P

=

Gen(w; r)}. For any subset£

c W let Gen*(£) be the union Uwa Gen*(w).

For a sketch P, let Gen- 1 (P) = { w: 3r: Gen(w; r) = P}. Similarly, if Sis a set of sketches,
let Gen- 1 (S)

=

{w: 3r Gen(w;r) E S}.

Lemma 5.4.1 (Boyen [13]) Let Gen and Rec be an (m, m', d, D.) reusable sketch where

A c D. is a group of isometric permutations. Then:
1. The reusable sketch Gen and Rec divide M into at most 2m-m' equivalence classes, £i
where w,w' E £i if!Gen*(w)
2. Vo E A, Vi, o(£i)

= Ej

= Gen*(w').

for some j.

3. These classes £i are determined by the sketch protocol alone.

4. Each class £i can be considered an error correcting code with minimum distance d.
5. For all i,j, l£il =

IEJI·

(As such, let 1£1 be the size of any class£).

To prove that it is impossible to construct a strongly robust sketch secure against computationally unbounded adversaries, we show that any reusable sketch is not statistically
strongly robust. The conclusion follows as a statistically strongly robust sketches must be
reusable, else an adversary can view multiple sketches, recover w and make a valid sketch.
As a high level idea of our approach, we first give the following inefficient attack, which
suffices to prove our main impossibility result in the keyless case:

Theorem 5.4.2 Let Gen, Rec be a reusable sketch for reasonable D.. Then Gen, Rec is not
statistically strongly robust for d

> 1. 1

1
Jf d = 0, our proof may not apply; the construction may be "robust" simply because there exists no
different P* that could be output. Such a sketch can no longer be legitimately called "fuzzy" however.
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Proof. Let W, W' be a (d- 1, m)-pair, which is always a (d, m)-pair.

The attack is relatively simple. We simply obtain, through queries, the entire class
Gen*(w). (We make queries until, with high probability, every random tape for Gen will have
been used at least once.) Gen*(w) uniquely determines £i, the equivalence class containing

w. Find J 1 (£i)· By Lemma 5.4.1, there is some £1 = J 1 (£i)· Select w" E £1 and find a
P* E Gen*(w") such that P* tj_ Gen*(£i), and let J* be the identity. Output J*, P* as the

forged sketch.
We know we can find such a P* because llw- t5 1 (w)ll
distance between values in £i is

~

=

1 < d, and the minimum

d (this follows from the fact that £i can be thought of

as a code, by Lemma 5.4.1). As such t5 1 (w)

E £1

P* E Gen*(£1) that is not in Gen*(£i), else £i

and J 1(w) tj_ [i There must be one sketch

= £1 which would

be a contradiction.

Due to the error correcting properties of Rec, Rec(w', P*) will output w 111 E £1 . This is
due to the fact that P*

=

Gen(J 1 (w); r) for some valuer and llw', J 1 (w)ll:::; (d -1) + 1 =d.

D

There are three things the adversary in the above attack is required to do.
1. The adversary must successfully determine the "correct" equivalence class £i of a
secret w given enough sketches of w.
2. The adversary must successfully sample the equivalence class 15 1 (£i) knowing only £i.
3. The adversary must be able to find a sketch P* such that P* E Gen*(t5 1 (£i)) yet
P* tj_ Gen*(£i)·

For an unbounded adversary, these three tasks are easy to accomplish, though they do
require exponential memory / computation time. We give a more efficient attack in the
Section 5.5 that allows us to determine the correct equivalence class £i much quicker for
generic sketch protocols.
We also note that for most known sketch constructions it is relatively easy to learn £i,
(in fact for the code offset sketch £i is determined by only one sketch), and also that for all
i,j, Gen*(£i)

n Gen*(£1)

=

0. So while this attack as written is not very efficient, for most
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known sketch constructions it can be used to develop a polynomial time attack against the
robustness the strong robustness of the construction.
The above attack pertains to sketches that do not use a secret key. If a sketch protocol
uses a secret key f.L then Gen may take that key as input and the above attack may not work
anymore. An extension of the attack to small length f.L is relatively easy however.

Theorem 5.4.3 Let Gen and Rec be a sketch which utilizes a secret key f.L, where IILI =
O(loglwl). Then if (Gen, Rec) is reusable

for~

that contains a group of isometric permu-

tations including a 81 , it is not robust.
Proof. The attack proceeds similarly to the attack in the previous theorem, with the addition

that the adversary guesses at the secret key f.L at the very beginning. If A successfully
guesses the key, then A can run the previous attack and thus breaks strong robustness. The
probability of A selecting the correct key is non-negligible in lwl because of the size of 1-l·

D

We do not give any results concerning a statistically strongly robust sketch which utilizes
a secret key larger than logarithmic in size of the secret. Such a key can be expanded using a
pseudorandom generator to any size needed to provide an authenticated channel and many
techniques for key agreement over such channels are known. 2

5.4.1

Impossibility Results on Fuzzy Extractors

Our results also extend to the ideas of strongly robust fuzzy extractors. It is easy to see
how this is the case for all "standard" fuzzy extractor constructions, constructions where
Fsk outputs a sketch Gen(w) for some sketch that is later used to recover w by Rep. As
the validity of Fsk is based on the validity of the sketch Gen, we can utilize all the results
of Lemma 5.4.1 and Theorem 5.4.2. However, for general constructions of fuzzy extractors
it may not be the case that we can use the results of Boyen. Most notably, we do not
immediately know if 8

E

A maps pre-image sets to pre-image sets, and we do not know if

the preimages induced by Fsk form a code.
2

Assuming the existence of exponentially hard cryptography, a polylogarithmic key suffices against any
polynomial adversary.
·

58
We can utilize Claims 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, and 11.4 from Boyen to demonstrate that Fsk
must split up M into equivalence classes, and that 6 E A must map classes to classes as
the proofs of these claims generalize to reusable fuzzy extractors, since the claims only
rely on the fact that there must be some min-entropy remaining in w, even after seeing all
conceivable sketches of w a fact which must be true for a strongly robust fuzzy extractor
as well, else an unbounded adversary could easily break the strong robustness of the fuzzy
extractor.
However, if Rep(w, Fsk(w))

=

Rep(w', Fsk(w')) for w, w': llw- w'll : : : d, then it may be

the case that the equivalence classes induced by Fsk do not form an error correcting code.
As long as we allow that there is a 6k, k < n such that 6k maps one class to a different
class then we can maintain both of the assumptions necessary for Theorem 5.4.2 and as
such break strong robustness of that extractor.
We also note that as long as the fuzzy extractor has the property that we need not see

every sketch of a secret w before we can find the equivalence class Fsk- 1 (Fsk(w)), then we
need make no assumptions about 6 at all as our more efficient attack in Section 5.5 will be
able to find a valid new sketch of w as it will not need to see all valid sketches of the w to
determine the correct equivalence class.

5.5

Specific Impossibility Results

Our impossibility results in Section 5.4 demonstrate that previous constructions cannot be
statistically strongly robust. In this section, we extend these results and show that some
previous constructions are not strongly robust even in a computational sense. We give an
attack that works on the constructions of [35, 20]. We then go on to enhance our previous
attack against generic fuzzy extractors to greatly increase its efficiency.
We first give the construction of a robust fuzzy extractor that is found in [35, 20]. Let

SS(w) be a deterministic, linear sketch. As such, there is a matrix S such that SS(w) = Sw.
Let S' be a matrix such that

g, has full rank.

Let SS' (w)

= S' w. For c = SS' (w), let

a be
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the first half of c, b the second half, where both a and b are viewed as elements of lF 2n' /2.
Set L = 2t,. Lets= 55(w). Pads such that lsi = Ln' /2 and then splits into L bit strings
of size n'/2. Define fs,i(x) = xL+ 3 + x 2 (sL-1XL-l +

S£-2XL- 2

defined as Fsk(w) = (s,i,u) where i is randomly selected,

O"

+ ... +so)+ ix. Fsk is now

is the last v bits of !s,i(a) + b

and where R is the remaining bits of !s,i(a) +b.
We give two attacks. The first attacks the post-application robustness of this scheme,
the second attacks the pre-application robustness.
• A makes two public queries where J = 0, receiving s, i,u, Rands', i', u', R' (A receives

R and R' due to the fact that it is a post-robustness attack).
• A denotes X= Rllu and X'= R'llu'.
• A computes X- X' = (i- i')a due to the fact that 55(w) is deterministic and for
both queries J = 0.
• A finds a= (X- X')(i- i')- 1 = (i- i')- 1 (i- i')a =a.

• A finds b =X- !s,i(a).
Once A finds both a and b and given that 55' is linear and 55 is linear, A can easily
compute a new sketch for any J =1- 0 and any i.
This next attack demonstrates that this protocol is not pre-application robust, so as
such the adversary does not receive the extracted key R.
• A makes two public queries where J = 0, receiving s,i,u and s',i',u'.

• A computes

O"-

u' = !s,i(a) + b]Y- Us',i'(a)

+ b)]Y =

(i- i')a]y.

• A makes a new public query where J = 0, and receives s",i",u".
• A creates a new sketch where s* = s", i* = (i- i') + i" and u* = u" +

O"-

u'.

Due to the fact that for all these public queries, J = 0 we have that s = s' = s" = s*.
We have fs,i•(a) = fs,i"(a) + (i- i')a = fs,i"(a) +
the s*, i*, u* is a valid sketch.

0"- 0"

1

as such u* = u" +

O"-

u' and so
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More efficient generic attack

Next, we describe a general attack that should be more

efficient than the one given in our general impossibility result. Let w* be the secret value.
Attack. We note that we can break all sketches into two cases: 1) Gen- 1 (P)
£* is a single class and 2) Gen- 1 (P)

=

=

£* where

£i 1 U · · · U £ik for some k equivalence classes where

k 2:: 2. In case 1, we know the correct equivalence class after only one sketch. As such

we need only output another sketch from P*, set 8* to the identity and we are done. This
attack will work due to the fact that all sketches in £* are capable of being produced by
the secret w*.
If we are in case 2 however, we have two options. If IGen*(£i 1 ) n · · · n Gen*(£ik)l 2:: 2

then there exists another sketch P* such that P* E Gen* (£i 1 ) n · · · n Gen* (£ik), P*

f:.

P,

=

0.

P* E Gen*(£*) and as such P* is a valid sketch of w, and we are done.

Therefore, we assume that this is not the case and 1Gen*(£i 1 ) n · · · n Gen*(£ik)\PI

A then requests another sketch of w, receiving a new P not equal to any prior P. By
Lemma 5.4.1, if it is true that Gen- 1 (P2) n Gen- 1 (P)

= £i,I

U · · · £i' where k'
k1

< k, and £i'J c

Gen- 1 (P) for all j otherwise we contradict our assumption that Gen*(£i 1 ) n · · · n Gen*(£ik)
contains only P.
Thus, for every sketch that we see, we are able to eliminate at least one equivalence
class from the set of possible classes. Denote the current set of q sketches seen by A as Pq.
A continues by examining the current intersection of the images of the possible equivalence
classes, excluding all sketches in Pq· If this set is non-empty, then a new valid sketch of w
was found, and we are finished. Otherwise, A requests another sketch, removing at least
one equivalence class from consideration. This process continues until we have found either
a valid sketch of w, or have determined the correct equivalence class£* and as such we can
run the attack from Theorem 5.4.2.
For most sketches j fuzzy extractors this should result in a polynomial time attack
against the strong robustness of the sketch. This is due to the fact that the classes £i are
often efficiently samplable, and the fact that for most known protocols Gen- 1 (P) equals one
and only one equivalence class £i.
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5.6

Strongly Robust Fuzzy Extractor Constructions

In this section we give a construction of a strongly post-application robust fuzzy extractor.
We modify the construction in [19] to obtain both resuability and strong-robustness.
We construct our fuzzy extractor in the common random string (CRS) model. While it
would be preferable to construct a fuzzy extractor without resorting to a common string,
we note that the only properties we require out of our string is that it is common to all
parties involved, that it is random, and that it is resistant to modification by the adversary.
Similarly to [19] our common string need only be chosen once when the system is designed,
can be hard coded into all software implementing the system or can be chosen by the parties
involved in using the sketch, and can be observed (though not modified) by the adversary.
We do not believe that this significantly increases the amount of trust required, a view
shared by Cramer et al.
Our construction will rely on a linear strong extractor, as well as an xor related-key
secure MAC. While there has been little successful work on constructing provably relatedkey secure primitives, we do note that some papers (including Cramer et al. [19]) make
use of MACs that are one-time related-key secure. In addition we note that a practical
construction of a xor related key secure MAC exists under the SHCF problem, which was
discussed earlier.

Definition 5.6.1 A family of functions MAC'kel : {0, 1}*---> {0, l}n is an xor-related key
secure MAC if the maximum advantage ADV-MACRK(A, MACel, n) is negligible inn, where
ADV-MACRK(A, MACe 1,n) is defined to be

ADV-MACRK(A, MAcrel, n) = Pr[k

<-

{0, l}n; (x, a, o)

<-

Ao;;et : MAq~ 8 (x) =a]

Where x was not a query made to O'j(1 and where o;:.el returns MAq~ 8 (x) on input (x, 8).
We now give our construction. Let M

= {0, 1}n under the Hamming metric. Let Gen be
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a (m, m', d) deterministic linear sketch. As such, Gen(w)

= Hw

for some n- k x n matrix

H. Note, the syndrome sketch described earlier is such a sketch. Let l be a parameter such

that l :::; Im' - 2log ~ l· Parse our CRS as a matrix S such that -i is an n x n matrix. Let
SM be the first lMAC rows of Sand let Sx be the remaining lxeY rows, so lMAc+lxeY

= l.

Let MACJl be an xor-related key secure MAC using key fL· We now construct our strongly
robust fuzzy extractor.
Definition 5.6.2 (Fsk(w))
1. Let fJ = SMw.

2. Let Q

= Gen(w) = Hw.

3. Let R

=

Sxw.

4. LetT= MACJl(Q)
5. Output P

=

(Q, T), R

Definition 5.6.3 (Rep(w',P))
1. Run w" = Rec(w', P).

2. Set

{1,

1

3. Set T1

= SMw" and R = Sxw".

= MACil'(Q).

4. If T = T1 output R else output

l_.

We now prove some theorems bounding the entropy loss on w due to an unbounded
adversary seeing multiple sketches. We note that although H and S are chosen randomly,
-i is of full rank with overwhelming probability. In what follows, we assume that -i is of
full rank.
Lemma 5.6.4 Let Ci be an equivalence class of the sketch Gen. Then if -i is of full rank,
S is a bijection from Ci to {0, 1}1.
Proof. We first show that S is injective. If it is not, then for some X, X' E Ci such that
SX = SX', we know that -iX = -iX' because of the fact that HX = HX' by the definition
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of Ci· Thus ~ is not full rank as it is not injective. Surjectivity comes from the fact that S
is injective and that ~ is n by n.

D

Immediately from this we get the following corollary:
Corollary 5.6.5 SM can be thought to partition each class Ci into a partition of "subclasses"

~z

where X E

~z

if X E Ci and SMX

=

z.

Note that this is not necessarily true of a generic linear extractor.
This allows us to prove the following Theorem. Let Fsk*(w)

= {8, Fsk(8(w))l8 E

~}.

Theorem 5.6.6 Hoo(W!Fsk*(W), S~w) 2:: m' -lMAC·
Proof. We prove this theorem by bounding the min-entropy for 8 = 8o, then showing that

by the linearity of this construction no further min-entropy is lost for 8

E ~Ell

i-

8o. With

overwhelming probapility we may assume ~ is of full rank.
By the reusability of Gen we know that Gen divides M into equivalence classes Ci such
that Gen(wi)

=

Qi

for all

Wi E Ci·

By the previous lemma we can say that S divides each

class Ci into subclasses ~1-' where Vw, w' E ~~-', Gen(w)

= Gen(w'),

= SMw'. Since SM

SMw

is a permutation on each class, for each class Ci, there are 21MAC classes~~-'. As such, by
Lemma 5.4.1 and the previous sentence there are at most
and by setting m

= n,

2m-m'+lMAc

the maximum entropy, each class is of size

equivalence classes

2m'-LM Ac.

We now consider an adversary who makes queries to Fsk(8(w)) where 8

i- 8o. Since the

sketch is deterministic and linear we know that Gen(8(w)) can be calculated directly from
Gen(w) and 8. We also know that if J-l

=

SMw, then J-l6x

such, the adversary can pre-calculate the values of Q and

=
T

SM8x(w)

=

SMw EB SMX· As

before making the query to Fsk

and as such the query adds no additional information.

D

We now prove that (Fsk, Rep) is an (m, lKEY, d, ~Ell' E) reusable fuzzy extractor.
Theorem 5.6.7 (Fsk, Rep) is an (m, lKEY, d,

~Ell'

E) reusable fuzzy extractor.

Proof. This comes from the fact that Sw is a linear extractor for

~Ell

by the fact that it is

xor-universal and the leftover hash lemma. As such SKw is statistically close to random,
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even given T and SMw. We maintain the advantage for SKbx(w) as D-EB is a group and as
such any adversary capable of calculating SKbx(w) can calculate SKw.

D

We now show our construction is strongly post-application robust.
Theorem 5.6.8 (Fsk, Rep) is a strongly post-application robust fuzzy extractor for D. = D-EB.
Specifically, for all polynomial time adversaries A, ADV-ROBUST!e-post(A, Gen, Rec, D.EB) ~

ADV-MACRK(A, MAC, lMAC)
Proof.

+2-m'+lMAC

Before giving the reduction, we remind ourselves that since we are selecting S

randomly Sw is an xor-universal hash function. Thus, by the leftover hash lemma we can
consider J-L to be random, even given S. Moreover, we can consider R to be statistically
indistinguishable from random even given S and J-L.
We now transform an adversary A who violates post-application robustness to an A'
which defeats the related-key security of the MAC. A' plays the part of the challenger,
using his oracle to help him create sketches. A' first selects a (d, m)-pair W, W' and samples
them to obtain w, w'. When A requests a sketch Fsk(Ji(w)), A' computes Qi = Gen(Mw)),
J~ = SMJi, and asks forTi= orel(Qi, JD. A' then returns Pi= (Qi, Ti) to A. When A makes

a key query for query j, A' returns a random value Rj. Eventually A returns a sketch
(Q*,T*),J* and A' outputs Q*,T* as its forgery under the key offset SMJ*.

The main difficulty in the proof is that when A' makes a sketch Q of a query w, and
asks for a MAC of Q, the MAC oracle orel will with high probability not be using the key
S MW and will rather be using a different random key K.
To overcome this difficulty we note that for the sketch Q there is a secret w' such
that SMw' = K and that Q = Gen(w'). This comes from the fact that SM divides each
equivalence class Ci into subclasses, and there is one subclass for each value K, (because SM
is surjective). Moreover, the subclass of the secret w is information theoretically hidden just
given the sketches. Thus the sketches produced by A' can be considered valid sketches of an
appropriately chosen secret

w', and as such A receives a consistent transcript of sketches.

for the one key query, due to Theorem 5.6. 7 we know that

each~

As

individually is statistically

65
indistinguishable from random even given J-l and all Qi 's. As such, the adversary A cannot
tell the difference between receiving a random ~ and the correct one. Therefore, A' forges
with the same probability as the chance that A breaks strong robustness, unless A happens
to guess the correct value w a probability which is bounded by

2-m'+lMAC.

By this bound on ADV-ROBUST/e-post and Theorem 5.6.6, we have that (Fsk, Rep) is
strongly post-application robust.

0

We note that if we are in the random oracle model we can create a strongly post
application robust extractor from more general components. Our construction is again
similar to [19], and is also similar to the insider-secure construction of Boyen [13]. As Boyen
does, we prove our construction in a "limited-query" random oracle model; we assume 0
is a random oracle giving l-bit outputs, and let lrAG

+ lKEY

=

l. Let (Gen, Rec) be any

(m, m', d, b.) reusable sketch.
Definition 5.6.9 (Fsk(w))
1. Compute Q = Gen(w).
2. Select a random value r.
3. Compute X= O(w, Q,r). Denote the first lrAG bits as

T,

the last lKEY bits as R.

4. Output P = ((Q,r),T),R.
Definition 5.6.10 (Rep(w', P))
1. Compute w"
2. Compute
3. If T =

1
T ,

=

Rec(w', Q).

T'IIR' = O(w", Q, r),

where

IT' I= lrAG·

output R', else output .L

Theorem 5.6.11 (Fsk,Rep) is a (m,lKEv,d,b.,E) strongly robust fuzzy extractor in the
limited random oracle model.
Proof. Since Gen and Rec are a reusable fuzzy sketch, the min-entropy of w given all Qi

values received by the adversary ism'. Consider each tuple (Qi, Ti, ri, ~). We claim that
the additional values Ti,

~

do not substantially reduce the min-entropy of w.
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Let S be the set of values w such that there is a Q and an r such that the adversary
queries O(w, Q, r). Note that in the limited random oracle model, we may assume that lSI
is polynomial in 1m. Unless the real w is inS, all that is learned from these random oracle
queries is that w

~

S. This information eliminates at most lSI values, each with probability

at most 2-m' given the known Q. Thus, H=(WI(Qi, Ti, ri), O(S)) ~ m' -log(1 -ISI2-m').
We denote m' -log(1- ISITm') as a.
By Boyen and [2] we know that a random oracle represents an optimal randomness
extractor, and thus for each i, and r, SD((O(w,Q,r),r,Q),(Ul,r,Q)) :'S

E

where

E

D

Corollary 5.6.12 The min-entropy of w, given Fsk(w) = Qi, Ti, ri, ~ is ~ a with overwhelming probability, given only a polynomial number of sketches.

Theorem 5.6.13 Fsk and Rep constitute a strongly post-application robust extractor.
Proof. The probability that the adversary makes a successful forgery is the probability

that the adversary can either guess the correct w, or that the sketch Q', r', T 1 is such
O(w,Q',r')

=

T1 • By Corollary 5.6.12 the min-entropy of w given the tuples Qi,Ti,ri,~

is a. For any tuple Q', T 1 , r' the probability that for a given w, 0( w, Q', r')
Thus, the forgery probability of the adversary is 2-a

5. 7

+

21 /Aa .

=

T

1

is

1
21 T AG.

D

Insider Security

Boyen [13] introduced the notion of an "insider secure" fuzzy extractor- a fuzzy extractor
which is secure even when the adversary is allowed to see the extracted values for adversarily
generated sketches and permutations. We prove that our strongly robust fuzzy extractor is
insider secure.
Definition 5. 7.1 (Insider Security) A fuzzy extractor Fsk and Rep is considered to be insider secure for an adversary A if ADV -INSIDE( A, Fsk, Rep, D.) is negligible, where ADV -INSIDE

(A, Fsk, Rep, D.) is the probability of A winning in the following game:
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Setup: The challenger samples W to obtain w.
Pre-challenge Queries: The adversary A presents up to q queries to the challenger
where each query is either a public or private query.
Public Queries: A selects Oi E ~ and receives Pi where Fsk(oi(w)) =Pi, R;.
Private Queries: The adversary selects Oi

E ~

and a public sketch P[ and receives

Rep(oi(w), P[) = Ri.
Challenge: The adversary selects any public sketch P* that was returned via a public
query, under the constraint that for all private queries c5i, P[ such that P[

= P*, Oi

must have the property that for all wE M, ll6i(w)- wll >d.

Post-challenge Queries: The adversary may make further private and public queries,
with the stipulation that no private query Oi,P* can be made unless ll6i(w)- wll

>d

for all w.

Test: The adversary succeeds if he outputs R* such that Rep( w, P*)

= R*.

We now give a construction of a insider secure fuzzy extractor. Our construction is
similar to the construction in Section 5.6 with the exception that instead of a deterministic
linear sketch, we use the code offset sketch of Theorem 5.2.3. Let Gen and Rec be the
codeoffset sketch using a code with parity check matrix H. Let SM and SK be defined as
in Section 5.6 with respect to this H.

Definition 5.7.2 (Fsk)

Q = Gen(w).
J-L=SMW·
T

= MAC!l(Q).

R= SKW.

Output P

=

(Q, T) and R.

Definition 5.7.3 (Rep(w',P'))
Let w"

=

Rec(w', Q').
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T

1

= MACJL' (Q')

If T 1 =

T

output SKw" else output ..l.

Theorem 5. 7.4 Our construction in Section 5. 6, replacing Gen and Rec by the code offset
sketch is an insider secure fuzzy extractor.
Proof. This extractor can be shown to be reusable via the same techniques in Theorem 5.6.5,

Theorem 5.6.4 and Theorem 5.6.6. We demonstrate how any adversary playing the game
defined for the advantage ADV-INSIDE can simulate its private queries. Once we do that,
we can limit ourselves to adversaries which make only public queries. The rest of the proof
follows from the idea that if an adversary makes only public queries, the game defined for
advantage ADV-INSIDE is the same as the reusability of the fuzzy extractor.
There are two cases. If A makes a private query with a Q never returned from a public
query he can simulate the result by outputting ..l. This is because if A can create a new

Q, T pair that will not return ..l, then ADV-ROBUST'(A, Fsk, Rep,~) is non-negligible.
We now deal with the case where A makes a private query using a Q, T, Oy tuple returned
in a public query. The first time this occurs, A can simulate the output by selecting a random
lKEY sized bit string R. For all subsequent private queries of this type, if the associated

public query was made with Ox, then A knows the output of Rep will be REElS K ( x EEl y) due
to the linearity of the extractor.
We next deal with the case where A makes a private query using a Q, T, pair that
was returned in a public query, while specifying a different Ox' -1- Ox. In this case, then

Rec(w EEl x', w EEl x EEl C(r)) = w EEl x EEl C(r) EEl C(D(x' EEl x EEl C(r))). If x EEl x' has weight less
than d, then C( D(x EEl x' EEl C( r)))

= C( r)

and as such Rec recovers w EEl x and as such we are

in the previous case. If x EEl x' has weight greater than d, then C(D(x' EEl x EEl C(r)))

=

C(r'),

a different codeword, if the error correcting program D can run at all. As such Rec either
outputs ..l or w EEl x EEl C(r EEl r'). Since SMw EEl x EEl C(r EEl r') = SMC(r EEl r') EEl J.l, where J.l is
the key used in the previous invocation of the sketch protocol, any adversary making this
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type of query can be said to know the offset between the previous key J.l and the new key
J.L 1 • As such, the adversary can simulate all queries in this case by outputting ..l.

As this covers all the possible private queries, our proof is complete.

0

We note that the main reason why we needed to use the code offset sketch in our insider
secure fuzzy extractor, as opposed to a generic reuseable sketch, was that we required that
Rec(w EB x', Gen(w EB x)) produce a known offset of wEB x, based only on x and x'. This
"linearity" property is not just found in the code-offset sketch, it is common to all known
reusable sketches, including the code offset sketch, its equivalent sketch the "syndrome"
sketch, and the generic reusable sketch made by Boyen [13].

5.8

Related Key Attacks and Authentication

The related key security of various cryptographic protocols is a relatively recent issue. On
one side, it has been found that many widely used constructions (such as DES and AES) are
insecure when subject to related key attacks and that it is difficult to construct new protocols
that are secure against related key attacks. On the other hand, it is somewhat difficult to
see how a related key attack could be practically applied to many different cryptographic
protocols, especially when those protocols are used in isolation as one usually assumes that
the key is stored in as secure a location as possible.
Consider a strongly post-application robust fuzzy extractor with the additional property
that for any sketch P

<--

Fsk(w) and for any isometric permutation 8 : ll8(w)- wll

>d

where d is the error correcting distance of Rep we have that Rep(8(w), P) =..l. We note
that our previous construction in the standard model satisfies this property as long as with
overwhelming probability MACp(Q)

-=1-

MACpE!lx(Q) for adversarially chosen x and random J.l

and that our construction in the random oracle model also satisfies this property. If a fuzzy
extractor possesses this property we consider it to be "well-formed". We can show that
such a well-formed strongly post-application robust fuzzy extractor enables us to construct
a related-key secure MAC.
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Let MAC~,~ where P .____ Fsk(w) be the construction that on input m, first computes
~ .____ Rep(w, P). If~ =..l, MACel outputs ..l, else MAC~e,~(m) outputs MACRi (m) where

MAC is a normal, not necessarily related key secure MAC.

Theorem 5.8.1 If Fsk and Rep are a well-formed strongly post-application robust fuzzy
extractor and MACx is a secure MAC, then MACel is a related key secure MAC.
Proof. Let A be the adversary which can successfully break the related key security of
MACe1. We will show that A must either break the security of MACx or the strong-

robustness of Fsk and Rep.
We construct A'0 MAC to break the security of MACx as follow. Denote the queries made
by A as ( (JW, JP), m) where JP represents the change to the sketch and Jw represents the
change tow. When A makes a query ((J'!f,J{),m), A' examines J'!/j,J;_ If J: is not the
identity or if J'% is such that IIJ':(w)- wll > d for all w, A' returns ..l. Otherwise A' returns
oMAC(m). When A returns its forgery (J':,J{),m*,T*, A checks the delta values again. If

J: is the identity and J'% is such that IIJ'% (w)- wll :S d then A' outputs m*, T* as its forgery

on MACx.
We show that A' provides a correct simulation of orel. We note that if for any query
made by A if J: is not the identity then with overwhelming probability Rep(w, J:(P)) =..l,
due to the strong-robustness of the fuzzy extractor. Due to the well formed property of
our extractor we know that if J: is the identity and J'!/j is such that IIJ':(w)- wll :S d
then Rep(J':(w),P) = Rep(w,P), otherwise Rep(J':(w),P) =..l. As such we can say that

A' provides an accurate simulation of orel for all queries made by A. When a query made
by A will return a result besides perp, it will return MACx(m) for the same random key
K. Moreover, since A successfully forges on MACel with non-negligible probability, with

non-negligible probability we can say that

m*,T*

is such that

T* =

that m*, T* is not a valid message tag pair for a different key K'.

MACx(m*), and also
D

This allows us to construct related-key secure MAC's from any already existing MAC
primitive in the limited CRS model of our first construction, or in the random oracle model
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used in the second construction. If a well-formed, strongly robust fuzzy extractor exists in
the standard model, we then gain the ability to construct related-key secure MAC's from
any MAC primitive in the standard model. Note that this does not give us the ability to
construct related-key secure PRP's due to the fact that the sketch is not pseudorandom and
the fact that related-key secure PRP's are not allowed to return ..L on a related key query
made by the adversary, as that allows an efficient distinguishing attack.
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